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Master’s Thesis

On the Heterogeneity of Social Development:
An Essay in Sociology of Time and Space

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Introduction: The Problem, the Method, the Object and the Sources of the Study

World's population shows considerable differences in all spheres of social life. People occupy different territories, reveal a rich variety of cultural habits, subsist on different resources, pray to different gods, entertain friendship with some of their neighbours and indulge in hostility with others. Some are more versatile in material production, others expose fascinating adaptability to the severity of nature, still others are unsurpassable in science, art or religious piety. All these facts may be subsumed under the term 'heterogeneity'. However this term obtains a far more acute meaning when one takes into consideration a social situation which arose in Euro-American civilisation roughly at the turn of the XVII-XIX centuries and abruptly set it asunder from the rest of the world. Modernity has exerted a powerful impact on all societies however far from Euro-American civilisation they are located geographically and upgraded the problem of heterogeneity to the matter of immediate moral, political and economic significance.

The issue of the pre-conditions of modernity refers not only to a historical past but simultaneously to the immediate presence. It has been virtually revived in the context of the current East European transformational processes. For East-Central Europe, it is nearly impossible to discern where the pre-conditions of modernity end and its consequences begin.

Western experience provides East Europe with numerous "clocks" and "compasses" which take form of curing receipts. However to what extent Western theoretical programs and practical experience are applicable to the New Democracy countries? This burning query permeates all the levels of discourse from everyday discussions to scholarly disputes and political combats. Not as an exclusion should be considered Samuel Huntington's opinion that

"At a superficial level much of Western culture has indeed permeated the rest of the world. At a more basic level, however, Western concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in other civilisations. Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures" (Huntington S. P. 1993 : 23).

A question, then, arises about certain subterranean currents of cultural, national and social quality which run across the political and economical contexts.

"...Real difficulties affecting the quality of life in modern democracies have to do with social and cultural pathologies that seem safely beyond the reach of institutional solutions, and hence of public policy. The chief issue is quickly becoming one of culture" (Fukuyama F. 1995: 9).
The methodological approach which the author will come on to apply to the problem of the present work boils down to one contention, namely that investigating the aforementioned socio-political contexts one should invariably put himself into the time-space mode of thinking. Facts ought to be located within the time-space framework, reasoning ought to be given a time-space directionality and results ought to be evaluated proceeding from their time-space positionality. The time-space methodology of scientific reasoning is the ethnomethodology since it does not confine itself to the creation of meaningful texts but attempts to disclose the process of meaning (in the sense “what do you mean by that?”). The processual mode of meaning involves the temporal accumulation of spatialized structures each of which is different from every other one and from the final product.

For this reason, the theoretical part of the present paper is shaped as a dialogue between the author and the prominent figures in contemporary sociology, viz. Niklas Luhmann, Erving Goffman and Anthony Giddens. Their works are taken at their face value, i.e. they are assumed to be meaningful, internally consistent and different from other theories. The author’s intention is to assess the capacity of these authors to transcend the temporal diversity of their theories and the difference of their theories from other theories. Much of attention will be paid to the analysis of the key concepts of these authors (e.g. self-referentiality, complexity in case of Luhmann, co-presence, interaction in case of Goffman, ontological security, the unconscious in case of Giddens).

Luhmann’s systems theory is taken as a representation of the macrosociological approach, while Goffman’s writings present the celebrated advance in microsociology. Luhmann and Goffman have colonised - and, as a matter of fact, discovered - the extremes of sociology’s subject matter, thus intensifying the macro/macro discourse. Giddens’ structuration theory is analysed in the paper as a recent attempt to bridge the gap between the macrosociological and the microsociological levels of analysis.

Additionally, the choice of Luhmann is determined by the fact that he has produced an up-to-date version of the powerful functionalist paradigm dating back to the classical works of Talcott Parsons and wittingly infused it with the phenomenological ideas of Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schütz. Choosing Giddens as another sparing partner for the discussion of cardinal sociological problems is motivated by his well-recognized capacity to digest, interpret and utilize the whole gamut of sociological movements. Criticizing Luhmann and Giddens means, then, scouting for the gaps in broader mental frameworks, while understanding Luhmann and Giddens gives a carte blanche to the fruitful utilization of the achievements of sociology.
Careful investigation of reasoning employed within and between microsociology and macrosociology can serve a good deal for the purpose of surpassing the given dichotomy. In the author's opinion, sociology without the micro/macro rupture is the sociology of the time/space nexus.

The relevance of time and space for sociological research has already been stressed by many sociologists, including George Herbert Mead, Luhmann and Giddens (cf.: Urry J.1996). The latter is, perhaps, the most zealous proponent of the time-space sociology, or a sociology with reference to spatial and temporal relations. He argues that the issue of time and space is "at the very heart of social theory" (Giddens A. 1993). Pierre Bourdieu makes the case equally strong saying that

"the temporal forms or the spatial structures structure not only the group's representation of the world but the group itself, which orders itself in accordance with this representation" (Bourdieu P. 1977: 163).

The author will try to further elaborate on this perspective and to give a time-space interpretation of the developmental heterogeneity amongst human societies. In his opinion, sociology of time and space can not be done successfully without references to the advances in natural sciences (first of all, to Einstein's theory of relativity) as well as to the material on primitive societies.

In the author's quest for the causes of social heterogeneity and the moving forces of modernity, the public sphere will deserve primary attention and serve as an object of the study. Following Chris Bryant, the author conceives of public sphere as

"a space or arena between household and state, other than the market, which affords possibilities of concerted action and social self-organisation" (Bryant Ch. G. A. 1993: 399, italics in the original).

From another point of view, public sphere can be conceived as an arena where the social roles are enacted and not the statuses celebrated. According to Kingsley Davis' well taken definition (Cicourel A. 1974: 14), actual performance of an individual in a given position (role) should be distinguished from what he is expected to perform as an occupant of this position (status). Public sphere, thus, includes all the members of a society who act out of categories of collective relevance. The analytical separation of the role-performing and status-holding domains should be backed up by the statement of their actual unity.

The author introduces the concept of social chronotope which presumes the co-dependence of space-as-time (self-referential) and time-as-space (body-referential) realities. Heterogeneity is the fundamental quality of the chronotope built on the principles of totality, diversity and selectivity. Totality represents temporal differentiation of an object, diversity refers to spatial differentiation,
while selectivity establishes the identity between temporalized and spatialized units. Temporality and spatiality involve their own velocities: the increase in temporal velocity constitutes the creation processes within the self-transcending system, it leads to the compression of space and the expansion of time; the increase in spatial velocity constitutes the reproduction of the self-transcending system, it brings about the compression of time and the expansion of space.

These processes of compression and expansion determine, on the one hand, the chronotopical dependence between sex and religiosity, age and ethnicity, generation and historicity and, on the other hand, the regionalization of public sphere. Four principal regions comprise public sphere, namely the front region, the back region, the upper region and the lower region. The relationship between the front region and the back region is made up of interaction and communication orders which hinge on the difference between the body-referentiality and the self-referentiality. The relationship between the upper and lower regions of public sphere can be described as the relationship of various sorts of social stratification. With deepening of the back and upper regions time expands, while the deepening of the front and lower regions leads to the expansion in space.

The analysis of social movements in Russia and the comparison with their Western counterparts shows that the Russian chronotope is characterised by the active back and lower regions. This is reflected in the popularity of transformational, pro-religious and ethnic movements. Contrariwise, the Western chronotope involves the activity of the front and lower regions of public sphere and, consequently, the development of feminist and counterculture movements. An important conclusion is made in the paper that tradition and change equally present in a society, although they receive unequal distribution in the regions of public sphere. Modernity is the unprecedented project of spatial acceleration and time deceleration.

The mutual penetration of Luhmann's and Goffman's theories allows the author to speak about society as the self-transcending system involving self-referentiality and body-referentiality as the modes of its existence. For the theory of self-transcending systems, the opposition of system and environment remains valid but an important novelty is introduced, namely that a system becomes system only when it gets to understand itself as environment. The self-transcending system involves the cyclic process of mutual reproduction of events, structures, actions and powers which are effectuated by attribution of the actors' selves and bodies to particular instants and points in time and space. The actor as the self-transcending system possesses the expert consciousness which the author considers a necessary substitution for the concept of the unconscious. The expert consciousness is a self-referential system
related to discursive and practical consciousness as to its environment and opposed to the body-referential system.

Factual material is called to make the method utilised, the problem posed and the object selected more fertile and representative. Here the author will draw upon the data on the socio-political development of Russia starting from Peter the Great’s reforms at the start of the XVIII and the information on the societies commonly known as traditional, or pre-industrial. The original data on the latter comes from the author’s 1995-1996 field work among the Erzya-Mordvinians of Samara Province in Russia (Dziebel G.V., Dziebel V.V. 1995-1996)¹. The author will also draw upon his doctoral dissertation in anthropology “Generation, Age and Gender in the Systems of Kinship Terminologies: A Research in History and Typology” (Dziebel G.V.1997b).

Part I. Approaching the Time-Space Sociology:
Between Luhmann, Goffman and Giddens

Luhmann’s Theory of Self-Referentiality

Luhmann’s systems theory expands revolutionarily the horizons of the scientific understanding of the collective forms of social life. His enormous oeuvre ventures into giving a complete sociological description and explanation to all the facets of human society. This ambitious project proceeds from the fundamental reconsideration of the Greek metaphysics and the displacement of “substances” with “relations” (Beyer P. 1984: VI-XIII). Luhmann’s theory can be best understood and appreciated if taken against the backdrop of contemporary physics and biology. As a matter of fact, the very notion of system was begotten within the domain of natural sciences and every ‘edition’ of system approach in social disciplines is, hence, "baptised" by natural sciences. Luhmann’s sociocybernetics is built on three conceptual pillars: complexity, self-referentiality and autopoiesis (Luhmann N. 1984a; Luhmann N. 1984b; Luhmann N. 1986; Luhmann N. 1989; Luhmann N. 1990).

In the classical understanding of the system which dates back to the works of Lüdwig von Bertallanfy (Bertallanfy L. von. 1968), it is implied that system is the multiplicity of elements which, through interaction with each other, generate qualities irreducible to the sum of these elements. Luhmann suggests that all the systems from the organic world of cells and organisms to social systems are complex systems, the ones which are so large that it becomes impossible to establish links between each element and every other one.

"...Complex systems are not characterised by full interdependence of all their elements... the non-effectuated interrelationships indicate their real ordering activities" (Luhmann N. 1978: 97).
Complexity refers not only to systems themselves but also to the environment of systems, the latter being more complex than systems. A system is at risk of being destroyed by its environment and, thus, it employs selective operations effectuating only those linking patterns within the system which are important for its relation with the environment. Selectivity is the reduction of complexity of the environment. A complex system is at one and the same time closed and opened (herein Luhmann surpasses the traditional systems theory distinction between the closed systems and the opened systems), it sustains itself through self-referentiality, i.e. through making reference to its environment and coming back to itself.


The reference is made via communication as the actualisation of meaning inherent to the system.

"Communication is not at all what the commonly held view (and quite often the ill-considered scientific use) of this concept takes it to be, viz. a process of "transferring" meaning or information; it is a shared actualisation of meaning that is able to inform at least one of the participants... That this meaning fundament is itself historical in nature, i.e., that it arises within the history of experience and communicative processes, is another matter altogether and does not contradict my thesis that communication does not transmit or transfer meaning, but rather requires it as a pregiven and as forming a shared background against which informative surprises may be articulated" (Luhmann N. 1990: 32).

A system can not communicate with its environment since communication precludes an understanding partner who by definition is a part of the system. Systems, thus, communicate not with the environment but within itself about the environment.

“...Sie haben keine andere Form für Umweltkontakt als Selbstkontakt” (Luhmann N. 1984b: 59).

Communication is the mode of the system's reproduction, or autopoiesis. Luhmann tries to escape from the potentially tautological construction "self-referentiality" without building multilevel models, which, in his view, would break the continuity of autopoiesis.

The relation between system and environment is described by Luhmann as the 'unity of difference' (Luhmann N. 1986: 7). It means that no system can exist without environment. Further commenting on the relation between system and environment, Luhmann introduces the notion of Interpenetration.
“Von Interpenetration wollen wir sprechen, wenn ein System die eigene Komplexität...zum Aufbau eines anderen Systems zur Verfügung stellt” (Luhmann N. 1984b: 290).

Interpenetrated systems remain in the System-Umwelt relation to each other which means that the complexity of one system turns into the entropy (Unordnung) for any other system (Luhmann N. 1984b: 291).

In the long-term sociological debate between the systems-theoretical approach and actor-theoretical approach, Luhmann presented the most powerful argument in favour of the former. However, paradoxically enough, the more vigorously a scientist holds to one conflicting side, the closer he comes to the platform of his opponents and, hence, the ultimate peace is at hand. The problem of correlation between action and structure has acquired another meaning. Émile Durkheim created the image of structure as a blind, obtuse and mechanic coercive power:

"a social fact is any way of acting... capable of exerting over the individual an external constraint; or, which is general over the whole of a given society whilst having an existence of its own, independent of its individual manifestations" (Durkheim E. 1982: 59).

Against this, Luhmann sets off a "rational" and selective system of events which is pointedly oriented towards the actor and which ultimately is the actor himself. He clarifies his position as follows:

"Structuralists have never been able to show how a structure can produce an event. At this point, the theory of autopoiesis offers a decisive advance. It is the network of events which reproduces itself, and structures are required for the reproduction of events by events" (Luhmann N. 1986: 174).

On the one hand, the actor is lionised to the status of event which reproduces itself and uses the structure merely as a means of this self-referential reproduction. The actor as a substance transcends the action as a relation. Here the influence of Husserlian conception of transcendental subject on Luhmann is quite evident. On the other hand, the actor is edged out of the scene and, as a matter of fact, is devoured by self-referentiality. Luhmann takes little pain to conceal this inchoateness with respect to the actor:

“Autopoiesis is the reproduction of elements that take part in the reproduction of elements, and all attempts to think of a last moment [i.e. of death - G.D.] will only produce a reproductive element. We can be sure that all of this presupposes and has reference to individuality in the sense of a closed, circular, self-referential network, in which the elements of the system are produced by the elements of the system. But beware: this not a nice theory, neither a theory of perfection nor even the perfectibility of the human
race. It is not a theory of healthy states. Autopoietic systems reproduce themselves; they continue their reproduction or not. This makes them individuals. And there is nothing more to say" (Luhmann N. 1990: 118-119).

Luhmann’s comment on death thinking as a reproductive element production sounds plausible and fits well into his general framework but what’s about the individual’s birth? A self-referential system can only reflect on the finitude of its existence and, when it dies, it, naturally, ceases to exist. Birth, on the other side, is embedded in the system’s current experience and possesses another logical status. An individual may contact another self-referential system (for instance, science) and learn something about birth but this is totally another matter. Awareness of one’s participation as the object in the act of creation constitutes, seemingly, a purely human capacity. One’s own death, on the contrary, can be envisaged by animals as well (everyone knows, for instance, cats’ and dogs’ habit of running away to a hide-out in anticipation of their impending death).

By claiming that the individual is a self-referential system alongside other systems of the described kind, one should also explain, or at least touch upon, the human exclusive capacity to produce material objects. According to Luhmann, a self-referential system can only produce self-referential elements and, thus, proceed with its own reproduction. However it is hard to imagine artefacts contributing to the autopoiesis of the individual.

One may counterbalance the self-referentiality with the body-referentiality, thus using the duality of the meaning of ’self’ (Selbst) as a relational element indicating the closeness of a system and as a noun conceptually opposed to ’body’². Luhmann is aware of this duality of meaning and also makes sense out of it.


Elsewhere Luhmann comments that ’self’ refers not to the system as it is but to the distinction between hetero-referentiality (the system’s openness) and self-referentiality (the system’s closeness) (Luhmann N. 1986: 175). As regards the body, Luhmann is ambiguous. He presumes that the body is a self-referential living system (Luhmann N. 1990: 2) but if it is closed from the inside, it can not be by definition a self-referential system. Thus Luhmann gives another comment which, apparently, brings his first assumption to naught:
“Was der menschliche Körper für sich selbst ist, wissen wir nicht” (Luhmann N. 1984b: 332).

One can not, thus, ascribe the body with any quality comparable to that of the self-referential system. Body-referentiality (Luhmann speaks of Körperlichkeit) means the reality from which a self-referential system is being observed as the totality. From Luhmann’s point of view, communication going outside of the self-referential system is impossible but the impossibility itself is merely a higher level of the world’s organisation. For the non-organic systems, for instance, self-referentiality also exists as impossibility.

It was Mead who introduced the problem of the opposing coexistence of self and body into sociological discourse and indicated its important epistemological corollaries. He wrote

“We can distinguish very definitely between the self and the body. The body can be there and can operate in a very intelligent fashion without there being a self involved in the experience. The self has a characteristic that it can be an object to itself, and that characteristic distinguishes it from other objects and from the body. It is perfectly true that the eye can see the foot, but it does not see the body as a whole. We can not see our backs; we can feel certain portions of them, if we are agile, but we cannot get an experience of our whole body. There are, of course, experiences which are somewhat vague and difficult of location, but the bodily experiences are for us organised about a self. The foot and hand belong to the self. We can see our feet, especially if we look at them from the wrong end of an opera glass, as strange things we have difficulty in recognising as our own. The parts of the body are quite distinguishable from the self. We can lose parts of the body without any serious invasion of the self. The mere ability to experience different parts of the body is not different from the experience of a table. The table presents a different feel from what the hand does when one hand feels another, but it is an experience of something with which we come definitely into contact. The body does not experience itself a whole, in the sense in which the self in some way enters into the experience of the self.

It is the characteristic of the self as an object to itself that I want to bring out. This characteristic is represented in the word "self", which is the reflexive, and indicates that which can be both subject and object....

The self is then entirely distinguishable from an organism that is surrounded by things and acts with reference to things, including parts of its own body. These latter may be objects like other objects, but they are just objects out there in the field, and they do not involve a self that is an object to the organism” (Mead G. H. 1967(1934): 136-137).

It is this self-possession that, according to Mead, sets humans apart from animal species.

Both Mead and Luhmann use the same concept of self-referentiality and practically identical terminology: Mead speaks of reflexivity and for Luhmann reflexivity (Reflexivität) is the processual mode of referentiality (prozessualer Selbstreferenz) (Luhmann N. 1984b: 601).
Recognising the paradoxical nature of the subject-object relation, Mead offered an approach which employed a revolutionary change in the cognitive directionality. He overstepped the old methodological contradiction between psychological and social determinants of human behaviour by advocating for the outside view on the inside experience.

"[Social psychology] is particularly concerned with the rise of such experience within the process as a whole. It simply works from the outside to the inside instead of from inside to outside, so to speak, in its endeavour to determine how such experience does arise within the process" (Mead G. H. 1967(1934): 7-8).

Luhmann openly subscribes to Mead’s rejection of subjective reductionism for which

“der Mensch innerhalb und nicht ausserhalb der sozialen Ordnung stand” (Luhmann N. 1984b: 286).

However Mead makes a strong case of opposition between the self and the body, whereas Luhmann unduly underscores the latter and fails to ascribe it with a status tantamount to that of the self.

Luhmann’s conception implicitly poses several additional queries. From where a system acquires its meaning which is crucial for its self-identity as the distinction between her own elements and the elements of the environment? Why the in-system relations are characterised by meaningful communication and the relations between systems are limited to "irritability"? Why there exists a multiplicity of self-referential systems each carrying out by definition its own meaningful communication? One would rather expect one universal and undifferentiated self-referential system plus its environment. Why self-referential systems exist at all, while each communication could have led to their self-destruction? Finally, why self-referentiality is not the only way of organising systems? It seems that Luhmann’s conception still is not free of tautologies although these tautologies lie beyond the level of basic definitions. Luhmann did not manage to cure the systems approach of its enduring practical inapplicability3. He has built a theory of society in general and it is difficult to make sense of this theory while dealing with concrete social systems. The main fallacy of Luhmann’s approach is its self-referentiality. The central perspective for it is the search for a standpoint.

**Goffman’s Theory of Body-Referentiality**

Alongside Herbert Blumer’s school of symbolic interactionism, Goffman has found his own inspiration in Mead’s heritage. Studying the interaction order, or people’s face-to-face behavior, Goffman was particularly interested in the time-space situation of social practices.
“Whatever is distinctive to face-to-face interaction is likely to be relatively circumscribed in space and most certainly in time” (Goffman E. 1983: 3).

For him, a ‘behavioral region’ is

“any place that is bounded to some degree by barriers to perceptions” (Goffman E. 1959: 106);

a ‘situation’ is

“the full spatial environment anywhere within which an entering person becomes a member of the gathering that is (or does then become) present” (Goffman E. 1963a: 18), or

“any physical area anywhere within which two or more persons find themselves in visual and aural range of one another” (Goffman E. 1981: 84).

and a ‘social occasion’ is

“a wider social affair,...bounded in regard to place and time....[It] provides the structuring social context in which many situations and their gatherings are likely to form, dissolve, and re-form” (Goffman E. 1963a: 18; italics added to all the above quotations).

This concern with boundaries grew into understanding of the interaction order as a “substantive domain in its own right” (Goffman E. 1982: 2). If the object of study exposes clear space characteristics, the field of study should also be situated in this framework.

As concerns time dimension, Goffman had allowed a somewhat obscure formula ‘barriers of perception’. Later he came on to speak about the ‘frames’ (Goffman E. 1974) which clearly bore a link to this early remark. However, as it is generally the case with Goffman, his later works are seriously disconnected with his early endeavors and the frames are lifted out of the initial place-bound dramas. Critics regularly point up the theoretical weakness of Goffman’s oeuvre and the ‘relatively little development of concepts which can be used transsituationally” (Psathas G. 1980: 54). The only attempt to built a typology of interaction concepts can be found in his presidential address at the 1982 meeting of American Sociological Association which was published already after the death of the scholar.

Goffman spells out several basic interaction entities: 1) ambulatory units when people form queues, files and processions and find themselves in each other’s bodily presence without necessary interaction; 2) contacts which embrace any case of mutual response availability with passing street glances, exchange of greetings, letter exchange or telephonic communication; 3) conversational encounters when people come together consciously and start a ‘clearly
independent undertaking'; 4) platform performances where an activity is set before an audience (Goffman E. 1983: 6-7). A certain continuity underlies this classification, namely the gradual decrease in the non-corporeal expressiveness. Conversational encounters form here one extreme (the side of the Ego and the side of the Alter are both active) and ambulatory units fall into another.

Platform performances are only specific cases of the general dramaturgical paradigm advocated by Goffman. Every interaction, in his view, is structured like a performance. People’s role-playing is a premise for behavioral regionalization. Goffman operates with the dichotomy ‘front region - back region’. The front region is any place where people act in front of others, while the back region, or the backstage, is “a place, relative to a given performance, where the impression fostered by the performance is knowingly contradicted as a matter of course” (Goffman E. 1959: 114).

“The backstage language consists of reciprocal first-naming, cooperative decision-making, profanity, open sexual remarks, elaborate griping, smoking, rough informal dress, ‘sloppy’ sitting and standing posture, use of dialect or substandard speech, mumbling and shouting, playful aggressivity and ‘kidding’, inconsiderateness for the other in minor but potentially symbolic acts, minor physical self-involvements such as humming, whistling, chewing, nibbling, belching and flatulence” (Goffman E. 1959: 128).

In the same way as conversational encounters are opposed to ambulatory units, the front region is counterbalanced by the back region. One may also speak about the deep back region when a person is sleeping. For others, he is just a helpless body which can be freely abused, killed, robbed of its possessions, sometimes removed from its place. In the army or prison the inmates can take advantage of somebody’s sleep and play tough jokes on his body: the rolls of paper may be put between his foot fingers and lighted up, his hair may be burnt slightly or the stinky socks may be thrown on his nose. While sleeping, a person may entertain unintended body involvements like mouth-opening, snoring, mumbling, spittle-leaking, flatulence; his appearance is ‘sloppy’; he may be caught out giving away personal secrets and self-referentially observe his clandestine desires in dreams. People have worked out definite sleeping arrangements: a separate sleeping chamber is considered highly favorable; normally only sexual partners are welcomed in one’s bed; when children of opposite sex reach certain age, they are likely to be given separate sleeping rooms. Those who may be found sleeping on the street are either drunkards or paupers, in a word, the people who are deemed by the society not fully human.

Since the person wakes up, his starts to move himself out of the deep back region into the front region of public performances.

With further deepening of the deep back region, one may speak about a person’s death. In this case, his body is the most unpleasant
thing for others to be in co-presence with and they tend to get rid of it. The death of the body, however, does not mean the death of the self; it is heavily compressed and in this condition continues to exist. People contrive funerals and wakes, make cemeteries and try to provide the body with a separate place there. An exclusion may be reserved for the close relatives of the deceased who wish to be buried nearby. Common graves are either the signs of disdain towards the self or a necessary arrangement, for example, in the case of war or epidemic. Primitive people are likely to communicate with the dead and for them the dead are no less interactive than the living men. Sometimes one may even encounter with the unprecedented dead body presentations as in the case of Tamerlan’s, Lenin’s or Pirogov’s mausoleums.

Evaluating Goffman’s legacy, Giddens has made an important observation that

“there is a system of social theory to be derived from Goffman’s writings, although some effort has to be made to unearth it” (Giddens A.1987: 110).

Goffman’s line of reasoning being continued with the preservation of logical consistency, one arrives at the body-referential theory of society, a theory which can be opposed and built to Luhmann’s self-referential theory. It is worth pinpointing to a paradoxical correlation between Luhmann and Goffman. Luhmann, while entertaining a purely macrosociological approach to social reality, builds a theory of transcendental actor. Goffman, on the contrary, taking the standpoint of the actor, discloses the macrosociological status of everyday interactions.

“When the individual presents himself before others, his performance will tend to incorporate and exemplify the officially accredited values of the society, more so, in fact, than does his behavior as a whole. To the degree that a performance highlights the common official values of the society in which it occurs, we may look upon it... as a ceremony - as an expressive rejuvenation and reaffirmation of the moral values of the community” (Goffman E. 1959: 45).

Luhmann has noted that interaction leaves no place for individuality since

“its essence is to take the role of the other and to avoid bothering others with one’s own problems or peculiarities; not to speak about oneself is one of its central norms” (Luhmann N. 1990: 110).

Figuratively speaking, Luhmann reigns in time, while Goffman rules in space. The macro-concepts of Luhmann lie “before” and “after” any critique. This correlates with the intention of this sociologist to write a theory which encompasses both the past scientific developments and the future contributions (cf.: Beyer P. 1984). The micro-concepts of Goffman stand “beyond” any critique. He
lived an unpretentious and reclusive life in sociology. Only the juxtaposition of these scholars can bring about an epistemological advance.

Both Luhmann and Goffman avoid systematic presentations of their theories. Every book by these authors comprises an independent study, which is conducted through the application of several key concepts. These key concepts, however, are introduced without much elaboration and obtain meaning only by mutual reference and interdependence. Pointed contemplation on the meaning of these conceptual pillars may enrich Luhmann’s theory with accuracy and Goffman’s theory with necessary abstraction.

Concerning the action-structure debate, Luhmann, exactly speaking, has rejected the Durheimian paradigm “from above”, whereas Goffman has justified it “from below”. If the theory of self-referentiality deals with events reproducing themselves by means of structures, the theory of body-referentiality deals with structures reproducing themselves by means of actions.

**Giddens’ Conception of Ontological Security and the Problem of the Actor’s Knowledgeability**

Among recent theoretical developments which attempt at filling the gap between macrosociology and microsociology, Giddens’ theory of structuration occupies a prominent place (Giddens A. 1993 (1984); Giddens A. 1990b; Giddens A. 1991). Its primary concern lies in the development of

“an ontological framework for the study of human social activities... a conceptual investigation of the nature of human action, social institutions and the interrelations between action and institutions” (Giddens A. 1991: 201).

The structuration theory presupposes itself, among other things, with the extent to which actions are grounded in the knowledgeability of the actor. Giddens makes an attempt to reconsider Freud’s theory of the unconscious and to reconcile it with the achievements in the investigation of the actor’s practical and discursive skills made first and foremost within the ethnomethodological and dramaturgical traditions of sociological thought. The departure from the Freudian heritage is achieved through the implementation of the late psychoanalytical theories, primarily that of Erikson and Sullivan, deemed by Giddens “extremely persuasive” (Giddens A. 1993 (1984) : 52). These authors from a non-sociological point of view have set forth the idea that the unconscious is not the only causal field for individual actions, the others being provided by the nature of social relations in which a person is involved.

Giddens holds to the opinion that memory is a “temporal constitution of consciousness”, while recall is “a means of
recapitulating past experience in such a way as to focus them upon the continuity of action” (Giddens A. 1993 (1984): 49). Memory is psychologically utilized through recalls by two modes of consciousness, namely practical and discursive consciousness. Practical consciousness involves what actors tacitly know about the conditions of their actions but can not articulate verbally, whereas discursive consciousness encompasses what actors are able to say about the conditions of their actions. The rest of the memory is retrieved by means of recall into what has remained to be called the unconscious. The actor does not have a direct access to the unconscious since there exists a “bar” which inhibits unmediated incorporation of these bits of memory within the “reflexive monitoring” of conduct (Giddens A. 1993 (1984) : 49). Giddens goes on to explain:

“The origins of the ‘bar’ are of two related sorts. First, since the earliest experience of the infant, shaping the basic security system whereby anxiety is canalized or controlled, predate differentiated linguistic competence, they are likely to remain thereafter ‘outside the bounds’ of discursive consciousness. Second, the unconscious contains repressions which inhibit discursive formulation” (Giddens A. 19993 (1984): 49).

Giddens has minimized Freud’s theory to the effect that “the unconscious only rarely impinges directly upon the reflexive monitoring of conduct” and “it makes no more sense to claim that every act or gesture is motivated - meaning can be attached to it - than it does to treat action as involving a string of intentions and reasons” (Giddens A. 1993 (1984): 50).

Giddens then proceeds to build up the conception of ontological security, which is meant to serve as a fertile ground for the explanation of the causality of human action. The basics for the conception of ontological security have been borrowed by Giddens from the works of Erikson, while the term itself, seemingly, was coined by a psychologist, R. D. Laing (Cassel P. 1993: 14).

According to Erikson and Giddens, the initial phases of a child’s development are marked by the resolution of tensions originating within the basic biological need system. This stage is characterized by the extreme attachment to the mother and the allotment of experience directly into the unconscious. Subsequently, the infant makes the first social achievement which boils down, using Erikson’s comment, to

“his willingness to let the mother out of sight without undue anxiety or rage, because she has become an inner certainty as well as an outer predictability... (P)redictability provides a rudimentary sense of ego identity which depends... on the recognition that there is an inner population of remembered and anticipated sensations and images which are firmly correlated with the outer population of familiar and predictable things and people” (Giddens A. 1993 (1984) : 53).
From his earliest steps in life onward, the child exerts trust toward the other and, alternatively, controls diffused anxieties. Both policies constitute the “most generalized motivational origin of human contact” (Giddens A. 1993 (1984): 54).

This “most generalized motivational origin of human contact” Giddens formulates sociologically by introducing the concept of ontological security:

“Ordinary day-to-day life - in greater or less degree according to the context and the vagaries of individual personality - involves an ontological security expressing an autonomy of bodily control within predictable routines” (Giddens A. 1993 (1984): 50).

Philip Cassel, one of Giddens’ followers and propagandists, further comments:

“This is a psychological state that is equivalent to feeling ‘at home’ with oneself and the world, and is associated with the experience of low or manageable levels of anxiety... Actors will draw on rules and mobilize resources to re-enact practices that are found comforting: waking at the same time each day; putting on clothes in a particular order; eating a familiar breakfast; catching the train at the same time each day and so on. Disruptions of the routine will typically be experienced as unsettling and care will be taken to ensure that events unfold predictably” (Cassel P. 1993: 14).

Socialization adds to the basic security system various skills which serve to sustain tact in relation to the people with whom a person is engaged in day-to-day interaction.

“Tact - a latent conceptual agreement among the participants in interaction contexts - seems to be the main mechanism that sustains ‘trust’ or ontological security over long time-space spans” (Giddens A. 1993 (1984): 75).

Making this analytical step, Giddens draws heavily upon a detailed investigation of interaction order performed by Goffman.

Several objections may be set forth as regards both the origins of the basic security system and its development at the advanced stages of the individual’s life cycle. First, so far no proofs have been adduced as to the applicability of the concepts (and, correspondingly, the terms) trust, anxiety and the like to the inner world of the child. However it seems to be far from self-evident. The method of complete observation which is necessarily employed by the student of child behavior inhibits a participational involvement into the internal structure of the object and excludes a role-taking strategy. The failure to follow these requirements unavoidably leads to the mechanic transposition of the student’s conceptual apparatus on the object under study. This situation reminds of the early stages of the anthropological research among primitive tribes when the constants of
European consciousness had been freely - though, as the later analyses sufficiently showed, unduly - utilized for the description of the savage life.

Giddens and the others stage a curious conceptual hocus-pocus: taking the concepts of specifically adult consciousness (in the virtual absence of anything else), they squeeze the child consciousness into their confines and thereafter successfully find the same concepts back in the adult world. It is hard to understand how a child can feel confidence, trust and anxiety, if they do not exist in his world. This formally elegant but actually blatantly wrong strategy can set rather a weak foundation for a theory.

The second critical observation is fostered by Giddens' allegedly convincing assertion that “differentiated linguistic competence” is a powerful means of the experience comprehension. On the contrary, language provides a rather stiff reflexive framework, which is desperately inconsistent with a highly differentiated objective and subjective worlds. A witty example of this proposition can be drawn from the ethnomethodological experimental archives:

“On Friday night my husband and I were watching television. My husband remarked that he was tired. I asked, ‘How are you tired? Physically, mentally, or just bored?’”

(S) I don’t know, I guess physically, mainly.
(T) You mean that your muscles ache or your bones?
(U) I guess so. Don’t be so technical.

(After more watching)

(S) All these old movies have the same kind of old iron bedstead in them.
(T) What do you mean? Do you mean all old movies, or some of them, or just the ones you have seen?
(S) What the matter with you? You know what I mean.
(T) I wish you would be more specific.
(S) You know what I mean. Drop dead! (Garfinkel H. 1994: 43).

The author dares to suggest that there exists no serious gap between comprehension in the situation of language-availability and comprehension in the situation of language-unavailability. To agree with Giddens, one should imagine the individual to be a sort of mature scientist permanently contemplating on the things which go around him. Scientific thought normally tries to overcome communicative deficiency by either inventing new words or, more often, attaching new meanings to the old ones. Using normative syntactic rules, normative phonetics and in most cases normative lexicon, it still makes the language look unintelligible and/or funny for outsiders.

The third point of criticism concerns the character of day-to-day routines in which the holders of the basic security system view tend to find another set of ample proofs. As it follows from the excerpts from their writings adduced above, they assume routines to be ideally of a continual and uniform nature. However it is easy to observe that each
stream of everyday life consists of a multiplicity of routines, which intersect each other and are fraught with mutual contradictions. People deliberately engage in, manipulate with and multiply the routines being almost always able to support their activities with discursively articulated reasons and on the discursive level remain indifferent to the inconsistencies thus created. Involvement in regular alcohol drinking provides a palpable example.

The life of an alcoholic contains three distinct paths: the normal routine, the drinking routine and the bridging routine. He/she breaks the normal routine and engages in boozing with his/her fellow-drunkards, and then he/she faces up with the necessity to lose the hangover in order to come back to his casual life pursuits. Each of these routines cancels the other out by involving a potential risk, which is often sought after. While being drunk a person may become a victim of a traffic accident or lose his face in front of other people, hangover may prevent him for a certain period of time from smooth engagement both in drinking and sober routines. If a person is seriously alcohol addicted, his sober routine may be even more harmful for him than the boozing one. A lot of evidence exist of the heart failure among those persistent drunkards who abruptly quit the habit. Despite these risks, people stubbornly engage in counter-routines seeking for relaxation, pleasure, adventures and new impressions about themselves and the others.

While bridging the routine, a drunker is likely to make actions which stand out against the fact of his sobriety and, though they receive his rational justification may look completely weird for the onlookers. A woman occupying an important position in one of the institutions in St. Petersburg is known as a heavy drunker and he has her own habits which help her to combat the hangover. She has to drink up at one go the whole pan of a greasy bouillon. She does not feel shy to do this in public, thus allowing rumors and giggles to follow her.

The nature of day-to-day routines is very complicated, disparate and risky. It contains as its integral parts ambushes into which the individual readily precipitates himself. Even if a man is seeking immediate security, it is only one possible motivation alongside with plenty of others. Mundane everyday life - to let alone more intensive life policies - is equally the quest for the immediate insecurity.

“... The individual makes bets and takes chances in regard to daily living, as when, for example, he decides to take one job instead of another or to move from one state to another. Further, at certain junctures he may have to make numerous vital decisions at the same time and hence briefly maintain a very high rate of bet-making” (Goffman E. 1967: 155-156).

On the one hand, Giddens has unduly concentrated himself on the aspects of tact found in Goffman’s writings. Seemingly, Goffman’s primary concern has grown into a problem different from what Giddens attributes to the term “ontological security”, namely why
people act out their encounters, i.e. need to find themselves in the bodily presence of others. On the other hand, the concept of self-referentiality attributed by Mead to human consciousness and raised by Luhmann to the level of systems theory has not been introduced into the structuration theory. Giddens’ chief fallacy lies in substitution of body-referentiality by the Freudian concept of the unconscious. Commenting on Goffman, Luhmann claims that the “corporeal bias” of his studies stems from and compensates for Freud’s “discovery” of the unconscious which edged the body out of the discourse about the self (Luhmann N. 1984b: 335).

Consequently, Giddens’ “bridge” called to fill the gap between macrosociology and microsociology has proved to be too short. Alternatively, the positive significance of structuration theory is grounded in the clearly pronounced contention of its author to place the discussion of time and space “in the very heart of sociological theory”.

Part II. The Conception of Social Chronotope

The Principle of the Heterogeneity of the Chronotope

If one casts a glance on the treatment of time and space in archaic societies, he will observe a tendency to think about these two dimensions in the unitary way (cf., for example, Skær S. L. 1993: 31-45). Giving no priority to either dimension stemmed from the nature of myth where the ’Dream Time’ was believed to exist eternally as a latent actuality of space.
The conceptual separation of time and space dates back to the Newtonian physics wherein time was absolutely defined as flowing independently from physical and social processes and unsusceptible to change (Adam B. 1990: 50). This understanding was later refuted by Einstein's theory of relativity, which echoes the concepts of primitive cosmology. According to it, physical reality appears as the "four-dimensional existence" and not, as in Newtonian mechanics "the evolution of a three-dimensional existence" (Einstein A. 1993 (1920): 150; italics in the original). The applicability of the Newtonian theory is confined to the situations when gravitational fields are "weak" and "all masses move with respect to the co-ordinate system with velocities which are small compared with the velocity of light" (Einstein A. 1993(1920): 102).

While sociologists have recognised the theoretical importance of the advances of natural sciences in the field of time-space ontology, their practical implementation within social sciences remains problematic.

"Whilst Einstein’s work has no direct practical application for social science, we need to take note of it at the level of theory since most social scientists understand natural time exclusively through the conceptual framework of Newtonian physics as absolute, objective, spatial and clock-like" (Adam B. 1990: 56).

It is essential that the theory of relativity was produced only due to the inclusion of the social context into the physical system of measurement. Time being conceived as dependent on a certain point of observation makes the whole Einstein’s theory sociological par excellence. Only for the social actor can time be intrinsically fused with space. Moreover if light is assumed to possess a velocity which forms a barrier between the 'time versus space' reality and 'time-space' reality and humans are believed to live according to the first model, then the question arises as to how did they manage to calculate this velocity. With a pardonned vulgarity, one might say that man should have chanced to be at the source of light before the latter started to move, waited until the light was emitted, outrun the light with a sort of stop-watch in his hand and stayed waiting for the light to finally arrive. While the human body as yet can not enjoy a ride with a speed higher than the velocity of light, human cognition surely can significantly exceed the latter. A conclusion suggests itself that social scientists deal, as a matter of fact, with the physics of the highest velocities - only they face up with these processes, so to say, au milieu du visage. The backwardness of the measurement system of social sciences in comparison to the measurement system of natural sciences is, then, quite understandable and proceeds from the qualities of their object. Husserl once noted that, in the case of natural sciences achievements, one deals with
"surreptitious substitution of the mathematically constructed world of idealities for the only real world, the one that is actually given through perception, that is ever experienced and experienceable - our everyday life-world" (Husserl E. 1970: 48-49).

The epistemological gap between natural and social sciences, seemingly, needs much more time to be filled and the fact is that the initiative should come from the natural sciences. Social sciences, contrary to the well-pronounced tendency, should pay more attention to integration into the scientific paradigm the worldview produced by the archaic and religious thinking. Religion offers a similar "surreptitious substitution" of a social reality as the following Durkheimian statement of Parsons suggests:

"What is true, rather, that it is in terms of what we call religious ideas that men attempt a cognitive apprehension of the non-empirical aspects of reality to which they are actively related" (Parsons T. 1968(1937): 425).

convenient to use the term chronotope known through the works of Michail Bakhtin. Its original meaning was the following:

"In the literary artistic chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one carefully thought-out, concrete whole. Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot and history" ((Bakhtin M. 1981(1937): 84); on the chronotope, see also: (Clifford J. 1988: 236-246)). To stress the synthetic character of time-space relations, it is

Referring to the conceptual apparatus of physics, one might say that the body and the self both possess their referential (gravitational) fields, which are not put into their respective time-space "boxes" but exist as time-space substances. Both the body and the self are characterised by values (masses) and the discrepancy of their values creates the difference in time-space modes of existence. The whole spectrum of the world's objects - from a leaf on a tree to the bulk of ideas - is located, according to their values, within the limits put by the body and the self. All of them create their respective referential fields.

A social scientist is not interested in the absolute mass of a human body and its relation to the absolute mass of a planet or a stone since the value of the self generating this system of measurement drops out of the calculation. Natural scientists so far have failed to present their results in such a way as to show, roughly speaking, where is "the body" and where is "the self". Without this distinction being made, a suspicion suggests itself that natural science had started to create "simulacra" long before this phenomenon was proclaimed a peculiarity of post-modernist condition.
Contrariwise, the social scientist’s point of departure is the relative and bi-directional value of an object which happened to be in the chronotope. So, the value of a piece of wood is less than the value of a stone, and that of the latter is less than that of an iron piece - in the context of making an axe head. However, in the context of making an axe handle, the value of a piece of wood is higher than the values of an iron piece or a stone. The referential field around a piece of wood is stronger than that of a stone or an iron piece, though with their physical masses the situation is the opposite. In the procedure of making an axe handle, the physical mass of a piece of wood coincides with its value, while the value of the idea about this equality is bigger than the value of the idea about a possible inequality.

All the objects found in a chronotope act as the vehicles in the communication process between the body and the self. Due to the fact that they possess different values, the velocity of communication varies. The less speedy objects are found in the chronotope the bigger is the distance between the body and the self. The individual’s chronotope is uniquely characterised by the distance between his body and his self. What one commonly observes as bodily, psychic, social, racial, ethnic etc. differences between human individuals represent this very distance.

However for a social scientist to admit that time and space are fused in a four-dimensional framework is too little a pace, it can even lead him astray. Their unity should not be understood merely as the assimilation of space by time, or of time by space. Both Newtonian and Einsteinian paradigms of time-space correlation are relevant and it is with their co-presence that social scientists thoughtlessly encounter. The chronotope is characterised by heterogeneity, which presumes the co-dependence of time-as-space and space-as-time realities, or the co-dependence of self-referential and body-referential systems.

Contrary to Luhmann’s conviction that “the system does not attribute the environment to itself” (Luhmann N. 1984a: 97), in the chronotope a system becomes system only when it gets to understand itself as environment. This relation between system and environment may be coined ‘the principle of double legitimacy’. Environment embraces the entirety of diversified surroundings in which an actor finds himself in the world, including the concrete people, the social institutions, the culture, the rules, the country, the nation, the state, the town and so on and so forth. Each individual possesses a unique perspective of the environment’s relevance, i.e. he is involved in an unprecedented selective project of defining each unit of his environment as either important or non-important for him. In other words, the question is why do we find ourselves here and not there, now and not then, with this thing (person, rule etc.) and not with that.

The body conceived as the environment of the self-referential system, and vice versa, downplays the fact of the self-body immanent
coexistence. One might say that both the body and the self possess the status of systems *towards* each other. Time passes and every unit employing a referential act fails to backtrack to its original self. Environment enjoys the compressed existence within system being imbedded into the latter’s internal operational patterns; environment’s expanded reality is another system which the first system observes around itself. Speaking about *Interpenetration*, Luhmann comes close to the notion of heterogeneity, however he treats the mutual dependence of system and environment not as a substratum of further relations but as a superstratum. Practically, he did not manage to introduce a standpoint for making a distinction between system for its environment, although this distinction, he concedes, is the *Ausgangspunkt* of the theory of autopoietic systems (Luhmann N. 1984b: 35).

Differentiation is a pivotal point in Luhmann’s view of the internal structure of the autopoietic system. It is the differentiation coupled with the selection of possibilities which makes the improbable state of this system probable, i.e. allows self-referentiality to appear. Luhmann includes in his understanding of complexity the distinction between the self-identity and the self-diversity borrowing them from Alfred Whitehead’s ontological theory (Whitehead A. N. 1969(1929): 30). However identity in his conception amounts to sameness as the void counterpart of difference.

The notion of heterogeneity is more accurate than the notion of complexity as it hinges upon the principles of *totality, diversity* and *selectivity*. Diversity marks the spatial ordering of the chronotope, whereas totality presumes the temporal differentiation. A Georgian-Russian philosopher Merab Mamardasvili writes:

“Then what is time if one dares to give to it a primitive but intuitively simple and clear definition? Time is a thing’s difference from itself. And what is space? It is a thing’s difference from other things.... The difference in space is the difference between one object and another” (Mamardasvili M. 1993: 167).

According to Jacques Derrida (Derrida J. 1972: 1-29; Derrida J. 1982: 1-29), discourse is made possible only due to the interplay of two operations which he called *différence* (difference) and *différance* (deferral). Derrida invokes the original undifferentiated meaning of Latin *differre* (with Greek *diapherein*) and speaks of *différance* as simultaneously “to put off until later, to make a detour, a delay, a reserve” and “to be not identical, to be other, discernible” (Derrida J. 1982: 8).


Thus, *différence* accounts for spatial differentiation of one object from another, while *différance* stands for temporal postponement, or,
in other words, for the difference between the temporal states of an object. If one takes Luhmann’s view on communication for granted, he will inevitably reduce it to the soliloquy, whereas Derrida’s conception affirms the multivocality of communication (cf.: Dumont J.-P. 1984: 148).

Selectivity establishes the identity of the temporalized units, on the one hand, and the spatialized units, on the other hand. System obtains its identity and durability not from its internal stability but from a correlation between itself “then” and the other “there”. Totality, or temporal differentiation, deals with possibilities, while diversity, or spatial differentiation, deals with actualities. Selectivity means the transformation of actualities into possibilities, and vice versa, via making choices between actualities and possibilities. Selectivity is the identity of the last possibility and the first actuality. It ensures the unity of the chronotope.

Environment possesses a higher degree of complexity as regards actualities, whereas system is more complex than environment in terms of possibilities. Every system conceiving itself as an environment tends to transform its own possibilities into actualities. This process also means the transformation of the actualities of the environment conceived of as a system into possibilities.

Selectivity can be also interpreted as velocity which is effectuated either in time or in space. If an object is able to survive through time, then he may be expected to possess a knowledge of various time layers. If one looks at an object from the point of view of his distinction from other objects on the horizon, he vicariously encounters with the compressed, or "archived" time. Likewise, if one studies the history of an object, the spatial characteristics of other objects are similarly compressed. Spatial expansion of actualities leads to the compression of time and, conversely, temporal expansion of possibilities leads to the compression of space. Space expands with the increase of spatial velocity, whereas the expansion of time is to be understood as the increase in temporal velocity.

Body-referentiality, or the existence of the environment inside the self-referential system, has outfoxed Luhmann’s reasoning by taking the guise of meaning in his theory. Meaning can be conceived both as the substance transferred in communication and as the background of communication if one assumes that communication (or self-reference) is the creation. Luhmann speaks of system's autopoietic reproduction presuming that this reproduction goes with an increasing spatial speed:

“According to mathematical laws, the arithmetic increase in the number of elements results in a geometric increase of the number of possible relations between them” (Luhmann N. 1978: 97).

Temporal speed is taken to be constant. Creation, on the contrary, is the reproduction conducted with the ever-increasing
temporal velocity. Creation is oriented reciprocally to both the subject and the object of reproduction. By transferring itself from "here" to "there", the self creates the body in its spatiality. By means of creation, meaning condenses, or, as Bakhtin could have said, "takes on flesh", and the utterance separates a "before" from a "thereafter". The important point of difference, however, lies in the fact that time accelerates not from past to future but from future forward into past.

**Time Directionality and the Expert Consciousness**

Seemingly, nobody would doubt that time passes. The answer to the question of time directionality is, however, far from being that obvious. In modern European society where time is measured chronometrically its direction is taken as that from the past onto the future. The only reliable evidence of time existence is provided by history which draws events from the ‘days of yore’ to the present moment. Luhmann strongly argues for understanding temporality not chronometrically but in terms of *Vorher* and *Nachher* and for a clear distinction between past and future (Luhmann N. 1978: 96; Luhmann N. 1984b: 377-486, 601). Important as it is, this statement still omits the problem of time directionality. The *Vorher/Nachher* opposition does not lose its validity whatever direction the time movement is assumed to have.

Giddens definitely entertains a conviction that time passes from the past onto the future. For him, memory is the only temporal mode of experience organisation. Human mind works as a device for retrieving information from the memory and its accommodation on the levels of the unconscious, practical consciousness and discursive consciousness. The earliest memories are separated from the later ones by a “bar” which serves as a divide between the conscious and the unconscious experience.

In the following, a different perspective on human rationality will be developed which involves its fundamental temporal redirection. In the authors opinion, the unconscious does not exist at all, whatever form it has been hitherto assigned. The knowledgeability of the actor is, on the contrary, full, total and ultimate. Total awareness of the subject is established due to the existence of the expert consciousness which swings on the pivotal importance of the chronotopical principle of double legitimacy.

The concept of expert consciousness can be elicited via allusion to Claude Lévi-Strauss’ theory of myth which should be considered the greatest advance in the study of archaic rationality. Lévi-Strauss has put forward a suggestion that myth is a process of mediating various cognitive oppositions such as good/bad, true/false, right/wrong, just/unjust, left/right, up/down, here/there, mother/father, germane/alien, raw/cooked, ash/honey, and whatever
else. Mediation in his theory means the reduction of broad oppositions to minor ones. He writes:

“The true constituent units of a myth are not isolated relations but bundles of such relations, and it is only as bundles that these relations can be put to use and combined so as to produce a meaning” (Lévi-Strauss C. 1977 : 211)\(^8\).

The mediation of oppositions is tantamount to the reduction of the spatial complexity of actualities, or *Reduktion einer Komplexität durch eine andere* in Luhmann’s theory. Simultaneously, myth enhances the temporal complexity of possibilities and it is in this operation that its significance for the past, the present and the future is rooted. Myth is composed of *mythemes*, in Lévi-Strauss’ terminology, which can be rendered as the language-like particles combining the qualities of event, structure, action and power. They can function only by attribution to a certain point in the chronotope\(^9\). For example, myth allows a human leg to tear off the body, to start running and to carry a valuable object under its knee; it fulfills its mission and comes back to its owner\(^10\). The leg can be torn off the body - it is an event; it surely forms a part of the body structure and itself is also structured so as to be able to perform its running or walking function; the running, walking or carrying function involves power. What makes the difference is that the leg is deemed unable to act independently of the body. However if one takes a football match episode when a player scores a goal with his right leg and another episode when under the same conditions he misses the goal, there is no point to argue that it was not the leg which acted independently of the body; otherwise, the player will score a goal every time he finds the ball controlled by his right leg. For a certain instant which belongs to the undifferentiated time the mytho-logic works well.

The expert consciousness presupposes that each person always has direct access to the boundless network of mythemes. These oppositions are identified by the individual *long before* their manifestations are registered by his discursive and practical consciousness and by his body. The manifestations of the oppositions are readily recognized by the individual as soon as they come around and they mold the motivational backdrop of his behavior. The fact that people do not readily verbalize their expert consciousness should not be taken to mean that it is the unconscious or the practical consciousness which is addressed here; it only means that the discursive consciousness is not the ultimate resort of individual rationality.

By implying that the individual is, so to say, always mature and responsible for everything which is going on around him, the author proceeds from the character of the chronotope and Luhmann’s theory of self-referentiality. Whatever the actor faces up in his life experience, are merely valuable objects which serve as a means of communication between his self and his body.
Practical and discursive consciousness must be treated neither as the levels of rationality, nor as the independent cognitive devices. They are the temporal stages of meaning actualization and represent the increase of temporal velocity in the communication between the expert consciousness and the body. The expert consciousness which presupposes the full knowledgeablebility of the actor is the self-referential system and what Luhmann has said about the latter can be fully used to describe the former. The expert consciousness stands to discursive consciousness, practical consciousness in the relation described by Luhmann as *System/Umwelt*. However, in the situation of the co-dependence of time-as-space and space-as-time realities, none of the operations of discursive and practical consciousness are possible without the body-referentiality being involved, or in Parsons’ words,

“There is certainly no empirical “self” known which is not an “aspect of” or “associated with” a living biological organism” (Parsons T. 1968(1937): 45, note 1).

The question arises as to how one can discern the work of the expert consciousness oppositions in the course of day-to-day life. In order to perform the same task in respect to his “unconscious”, Freud used to pay attention to the discontinuities of verbal discourse marking out such errors as slip of the tongue, slip of the pen, interjections and the like. This tactic seems reasonable but understated. For the purpose of “catching out” the expert consciousness, all discontinuities of human behavior - verbal, practical and bodily - are relevant. An individual’s illness, injuries as well as death comprise the breaks in his body-referentiality; his mishaps, bad luck, practical mistakes (like dropping a pen, stumbling on the road) etc. refer to the actualization of the expert consciousness oppositions within the practical consciousness; while discursive errors and inconsistencies, misunderstanding, logical faults, mental confusion etc. may be the results involving invasion of the expert system in the discursive consciousness. The ruptures may be of a very fine kind and they are essentially not pathological but mark the way a person runs his life.

Like myth, the expert consciousness is relevant equally to the past, present and future but it is not a ready-made program since it is dynamic and constantly changing in the face of an actor. The expert consciousness moves from the future to the present and in this sense the actor is pre-eminently a foreseer and not a reflection-bound melting pot of information. He/she knows a wide range of “mechanisms” which answer the purpose of reproduction of possibilities between the self-referential and the body-referential systems. *Fantasies, reveries, dreams, illusions* and *visions* perform this task between the expert consciousness and the discursive consciousness, *prophecies, magic* do the same between the discursive
consciousness and the practical consciousness, planning, needs, desires, expectations, hopes and anticipations carry them further to the body, while perception is capable of “accommodating” the totality. The images involved in this process of meaning construction are transformed from symbolic and “unreal” to empirical and tangible.

The situation when all these successive developments form a linearity drawn along the individual life-cycle was observed by the author among the Erzya-Mordvinians (Dziebel G. V., Dziebel V. V. 1995-1996). Women there usually dream about the sex and fate of their future child (seeing a hat in the dream means the boy, a kerchief - the girl, and the like) before they start in adolescence to engage in the rituals of fortune-telling when they normally wish to get information about their intended bridegroom; then they conceive a child and begin to expect that he will be born, and finally they perceive the “work” done. The same process characterizes their approaching the future husband.

People tend to unite on the basis of shared images coming down from future to the present. What Durkheim lionized under the name ‘collective effervescence’ and considered the source of religion and social solidarity, supposedly, lies in the sphere bridging the expert and discursive consciousness. In the modern era, social solidarity has been atomized into the micro-units of interaction where participants share expectations, hopes and needs.

A perspective anticipating the concept of expert consciousness can also be discerned in the oeuvres of Simmel, Durkheim and Goffman who emphasized the “sacredness” of the person and the rituality of interaction.

“...An ideal sphere lies around every human being. Although differing in size in various directions and differing according to the person with whom one entertains relations, this sphere can not be penetrated, unless the personality value of the individual is thereby destroyed” (Simmel G. 1950: 321).

“For the actor, others may come to be seen as sacred objects....[An actor] must conduct himself with great ritual care, threading his way through one situation, avoiding another, counteracting a third, lest he unintentionally and unwittingly convey a judgment of those present that is offensive to them....An idol is to a person as a rite is to etiquette” (Chriss J.1995 : 244-245).

The recognition of the sacredness of the person and of his possession of the expert consciousness is tantamount to the belief that he knows something about a context (i.e. possesses his own chronotope) which others can not grasp discursively, practically as well as bodily.

At the same time, the individual’s expert system is not only a sacred thing whose boundaries are respected; it is also an important social value which can be hunted for, sequestered from the person
and appropriated by others. Goffman’s data on disfigurements, defilement and humiliations with which the patients of total institutions confront (Goffman E. 1991(1961)), or the stigmatization which accompanies people outside the total institutions (Goffman E. 1963b) can be interpreted as a significant reduction of the totality of the other’s personality until only his body is left. In Russian prisons a category of people exists who are rejected by the majority of their fellow-prisoners and are called opuschenniye (literally ‘the degraded’). Any violation of the rules of inmates’ culture may lead to a humiliating ritual which puts a person into this category. The range of contacts with the others which this person can enjoy then becomes thoroughly limited. He is allotted with his own set of dining utensils, he always takes his meal at a separate table, nobody would take a cigarette from him etc. The opuschennyi is considered not fully human and he is constantly on the line of being insulted physically or even killed.

The individual’s expert consciousness may be essentially compressed by others. After a certain limit is transcended it may cause a damage to his body-referential system until finally the body is killed. Conversely, one’s expert consciousness may also expand and create an autocratic personality which exists at the expense of other’s self-referential systems.

In primitive societies, human body was considered to be a source of power and, in accordance with this belief, savages were hunting for the head, hair, scalps, nails, hands of their enemies. In this way primitive people were emphasizing the individual’s self-referentiality. Modernity has come to recognize the value of the individual’s body. As was noted by Michel Foucault (Smart B. 1988: 74), tortures and executions have been replaced by prisons, concentration camps and asylums where the ‘soul’, and not the body, is the primary target of punishment. This forced spatialization means that the bodies are kept alive there, while the expert consciousness of the individual is, so to say, “sucked out”. It is questionable whose mores are more humanistic and benign. It is widely known that those criminals, who were given life-long sentences, often said that they would prefer to be executed.

**The Compression and Expansion Processes in the Chronotope**

*Sex, Age and Generation as the Temporal Compression*

Body-referentiality, or the time-as-space reality of the body, rests on the following axioms: first, the body is “born”; second, it can not help but die; and third, it is surrounded by other bodies which form its horizons. This is the spatial finitude of the body’s presence. However several other axioms do not proceed from the body’s spatiality, namely the fact that one body can produce another body and there are inherent in the body orientations as to what sort of other body a body needs for its own reproduction; the fact that the
body changes on its way to death - which is not necessitated by the body's spatiality; and finally that it takes time for one body to acquire reproductive qualities - which is also superfluous for its pure spatial being. Time assimilated and compressed into space-like units nonetheless is present in the form of sex, age and generation. They might be distinguished as functional time, routine time and structural time respectively.

The semantics of these terms is as trivial for the common sense as it is actually sophisticated. Since the works of the feminist theorists Kate Millett (Millett K. 1971) and Ann Oakley (Oakley A. 1972), it has been usually advised to distinguish between sex and gender wherein gender is a social construction of sex. This opposition is by all means fruitful but in no way exhaustive. Neither the notion of sex, nor the notion of gender stand for the matrix of intersubjective relations moulded into the following mentally constructed sex patterns: male-male, male-female, female-male, female-female, or briefly, the 'same-sex' pattern versus the 'opposite-sex' pattern. In all European languages, the term for 'male' is understood in a simple binary opposition to the term for 'female'.

However it is not the universal classificatory mode. In primitive languages, one can encounter with a more complex division into, say, 'sister' for the female speaker and 'sister' for the male speaker, 'brother' for the male speaker and 'brother' for the female speaker. These distinctions being relevant, gender should be treated not in the absolute terms of 'masculinity' and 'femininity' but in the relative terms of 'auto-masculinity' and 'hetero-masculinity', 'auto-femininity' and 'hetero-femininity'. It is through these relativity of sex should one comprehend the recent outburst of preferences for sex and gender redefinition (feminism, lesbian and gay activity, the 'sexual revolution'). Certain interrogations underlie these social movements, namely to what extent sex forms a substratum for other relations usually taken as sex-free? to what extent the same-sex relations are void of sexual content? to what extent a masculinity (femininity) is constructed in opposition to a femininity (masculinity) and not to another masculinity (femininity)?

With the notions of age and generation the situation is similar. Being used to see age chronometrically, Europeans are perplexed by the primitive beliefs in the reincarnation of a relative's soul in the newly-born child. Meanwhile various indigenous peoples of Siberia, Middle, Southern and Southeastern Asia, Africa and America take into account the 'soul-age' of a child. From this point of view, he is older than the majority of other living people. This child inherits the status of the deceased person, sometimes his name and property and is taught to address his mother as 'daughter', his father as 'son' or 'son-in-law' and his older siblings as 'grandchildren'. These reincarnation concepts have imprinted into the famous Caucasian tradition of hospitality. Any stranger irrespective of his biological age - be he or she a child, a teenager or an adult - is treated as the most honourable
guest. For the time of visit his/her status amounts to the status of the elder but, on the other hand, he/she is not allowed to play any actual social role - neither the one that corresponds to his biological age, nor the role of the elder. In a word, his position is that of the being from another world.

When Europeans speak of generation, they have in their minds a broad age category encompassing people born within 25-30 years and separating them from their children (O'Donnell M. 1985: 2). Again, it is not the only content which this notion may possess. Historical study of kinship terminologies shows that generation is conceived also as reciprocal, cumulative or relative-age-oriented. The reciprocal generation, for instance, sets off not grandparents against grandchildren, parents against children but grandparents and grandchildren against parents and children and against uncles/aunts and nephews/nieces.

In the case of sex, age and generation, then, one may observe three modes of existence: the biological mode oriented on the physical characteristics of the body; the social mode representing cultural interpretations of the physical characteristics; and the mental mode involving a finite and cross-culturally relevant set of relational patterns. In view of the logical continuity of these modes, it is hard to determine where the body ends and the self begins.

*Religiosity, Ethnicity and Historicity as the Temporal Expansion*

Functional, routine and structural time being compressed allow to speak about sex, age and generation. Being expanded, they reveal themselves as *religiosity*, *ethnicity* and *historicity*.

Every religion, to a greater extent than any other social institution, is preoccupied with human body. It elaborates on the idea that even that self-body relationship which is sealed with permanent corporeal characteristics may drastically change at any point in time. As Luhmann says,

“Religion reformulates the conditions for insecurity. It interprets events and possibilities in a way that correlates them with the meaningful orientation of people” (Luhmann N. 1984a: 8).

Religiosity presupposes an experience field where the in-born sex characteristics are deemed no more valid. Gods far exceed man in masculininity, goddesses far exceed woman in femininity. The sex parameter of humans becomes meaningless and so is gender since there is nothing to which a social interpretation can be given. Characteristics which, from all possible viewpoints, are seen as self-efficient and, unlike age and generation, granted for the whole life span suddenly become relative even in their corporeal givenness. In continuation of the mental mode of sex, religion opens up a world where the relativity of the in-born traits becomes ever-increasing.
Upon leaving the body after death, the self will experience an unprecedented and unlimited relativization of functional corporeality, and the sexual organs are the only parts of the body which are expected to be used for their own sake. In terms of functional corporeality, the individual enjoys a much shorter life: through his sexual organs he experiences his birth later and his death earlier than through other parts of his body. He records the fact of his birth later than it becomes known to the people around him and the fact of his death long before the others begin to think about his funerals. Religion manifests the special relation to sex since, for the body, the only sacred object is a body of opposite sex. Together with sex, religiosity represents the principle of selectivity extending to the genetic level.

Ethnoses as the classificatory units based on ethnicity are commonly described as

“named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity” (Smith A. D. 1995 : 32).

However, since Max Weber, it is known that ethnos “can in no way be defined unambiguously” (Weber M. 1991: 172), viz. neither myths, or culture, or territory, or language, or solidarity, nor their combination comprise a necessary set of features perfectly separating ethnoses from each other and from other groupings based, say, on professional, territorial or religious unity. The only stable and indispensable characteristic of ethnos is, then, the ethnic consciousness sealed by the ethnic appellation, or ethnonym.

Ethnicity involves a three-fold paradox. The ethnic consciousness presumes that all the people belonging to an ethnos are relatives, although their biological propinquity is definitely out of question. This regularity taken by itself is not bizarre, since all the humans share the common origin. What makes it hardly understandable is the fact that people admit biological link to be relevant for one group of people, while reject it for another. This constitutes the basic opposition pertinent to ethnos, namely the opposition between ‘us’ and ‘them’.

“Ethnicity requires “the others”, outsiders vis-à-vis whom one’s own group can be defined” (Mach Z. 1993: 213, stress added).

The latter, again, is not paradoxical in its own right because the classificatory division into groups is unavoidable and does not invoke a logical uncertainty. However ethnos, unlike any other community, exists not only due to the assertion sustained by its members but also due to the negation exerted by the members of another ethnos.
"Membership in an ethnic group is a matter of social definition, an interplay of the self-definition of members and the definition of other groups" (Wallerstein I. 1960 : 131).

Ethnos, thus, presumes not only the ethnocentrism but also the xenocentrism as fundamental and favorable orientations to groups other than one’s own. Symptomatically, before 1884, in Spanish the word nació meant both ‘the aggregate of the inhabitants of a province, a country or a kingdom’ and ‘the foreigner’ (Hobsbawm E. J. 1991 : 14).

Taken together, these regularities form a conundrum. It can be unfolded and mitigated by the proposition that, on the level of the individual, ethnicity establishes a direct link between his identity and his body. The true meaning of the ethnic consciousness is not that a group of people deem themselves biologically related to each other but that each individual ties a collective identity to his body presence. Classes involve the association of individual identity with the means of production, territorial units tie the identity to a particular ecological and social setting, while the state consciousness concerns the individual’s reflection on the political arrangements. It is the palpable attachment of identity to an individual’s body that gives ethnos its peculiarity and sets it apart from other sorts of social groupings.

From the point of view of the chronotope, ethnicity may be treated as the routine time, the continuation of the mental mode of age. The association with the body which is introduced through the metaphor of blood kinship is unavoidable for the concept of ethnos. The inheritance of ethnic identification from the parents (or more distant biological ancestors) comprises the most frequent way of entering an ethnic group. In the latter case, it is most palpable that the individual’s life span is taken to backtrack with the same tempo through the lives of his ancestors till it meets an imagined forefather known as The Russian, The Jew, The German, The French or whoever else. The ethnic subject is understood as a long series of incarnations and via ethnicity his age is cumulatively multiplied. Ethnicity and age represent the principle of totality marking the difference of an individual from himself in time. The bigger the time distance the weaker are his memories about himself.

Historicity is the expanded structural time. Together with generation, it embodies the principle of diversity. It comes down to the successive accumulation of social information that is “stored” in social institutions of different durée. The individual faces up historicity through stratification, socialisation and education, and the generation hierarchy is the elementary condition of power exertion and knowledge transmission. The downward exertion of power has human body as its ultimate limit since power being accumulated enables one person to put the end to another’s bodily presence. If through generation the individual experiences structural time im mediately and softly, through the state he confronts with it momentously and momentarily.
The state so far has been the chief historicity-controlling device characterised by the exclusive right to kill a person on behalf and for the sake of the whole society. About generation the individual thinks in terms of his physical birth, and about historicity invariably with reference to his physical death.

Historicity is temporally boundless since it sets no time limits for collective experience accumulation; however it is always spatially structured with state and class serving as its boundaries. Historical epochs which people tend to distinguish and in which they are destined to live are, in fact, the leaps in time: there is only ceaseless alternation of befores and thereafters. The markers of colonised social space are always left behind and observed with delay in the museum of petrified events called “history”\(^{14}\).

Through sex and religiosity, age and ethnicity, generation and historicity the heterogeneity of chronotope may be observed as the fusion and intersection of space-as-time and time-as-space realities. The juxtaposition of these phenomena should not be taken as the equation or resemblance. The author does not intend to follow Freud in searching for sexual drives in people’s religiosity. The mutual dependence of the phenomena in question stems from the nature of the chronotope: it shows what happens to a micro- or macrosociological phenomenon if, by virtue of increase in its spatial or temporal velocity, time or space compresses to a negligible value.

Backing up the famous Durkheimian formula by a systems theory, Luhmann suggests that religion can not communicate with God, it can only reproduce itself through the communication with God. Likewise natural sciences can not provide reliable information about physical or chemical world and their results are relevant only from the point of view of their internal reproduction. With respect to ethnoses, Benedict Anderson used a now-popular idiom “imagined communities” (Anderson B. 1983). As a matter of fact, state and religion are the “imagined communities” as well. They exist only within an actor’s expert consciousness. Nevertheless every self-referential system possesses its surreptitious reality which emerges beyond its boundaries, i.e. in a body-referential system. The opposite is equally true: the same reality found in the body-referential system is a ‘surreptitious substitution’ for the reality of a self-referential system.

**Self-Referentiality and Body-Referentiality as Observed in Language**

Ethnonyms are not the only units of the formal organization of experience which tighten together an individual’s self and his body. **Anthroponyms** (personal names) perform the same function, although they manifest not the principle of totality but the principle of diversity. It is via the name that a person gets to comprehend his singular standing in the world, “drawing” his individual identity, his individuality on his body. The diversity, on the other hand, signifies
that a person is only one version of humanity and that his perspective on the totality is unique but not the only immaculate one.

*Kinship terms* must be placed on the same test-bench with ethnonyms and anthroponyms. Each person reveals himself as father to one individual and as son to another, as uncle to the third and as nephew to the fourth, as grandfather to the fifth and as grandson to the sixth etc. There can be no father without son and daughter and vice versa, no uncle without nephew and niece, no grandparents without grandchildren. Also, none of the kinship positions can exist without implying the other positions. Father presupposes paternal grandfather, paternal grandmother and mother, mother presupposes father and maternal grandparents and so on. Kinship terms employ the principle of selectivity based on the fact that people, besides mutual distanciation and uniqueness, find themselves in the network of varied and complicated relationships with each other. The relativity makes the individual feel his body being in co-presence and interaction with others and perceive that he is not only what he is but also the other.

Ethnonyms and kinship terms are grounded in self-referentiality. Two other lexical units employ the referentiality of the opposite kind. These are *partonyms* and *race names*. Partonyms comprise a lexico-semantic group which describes the parts of human body (head, hand, arm, blood, leg, nose, finger etc.). In modern European languages this group of words presents no peculiarity and differs in no respect from, say, the lexical group denoting the parts of building. Meanwhile, in many archaic languages (North American Indian, Melanesian, African, Siberian, North Caucasian and others) partonyms can not be used without special possessive pronouns which signify their ‘unalienability’ from the possessor. Other objects such as an axe, a cow, a house, are included in another possessive class since they are ‘alienable’ from the possessor. Symptomatically enough, in those languages only kinship terms can follow the same possessive model as partonyms and combine with the same pronouns of unalienable possession. Thus partonyms and kinship terms are deemed logically compatible and liable to the principle of relativity. One may also note a direct identification of kinship terms and the parts of human body in various archaic cultures (for instance, Maori of New Zealand or South African tribes). The principle of relativity enters both lexical groups but their referentiality is different: partonyms are oriented towards the self from the point of view of the body, whereas kinship terms work to the contrary. The spatiality of the body is emphasized in the counterbalance to the self’s temporality.

Ethnonyms may be directly opposed to race names or, more correctly, to the anthropological types labels. All the people divide into anthropological types and these types finally gather into races. Like ethnonyms, race names serve the same purpose of classification of mankind on the basis of people’s origin. They employ the same principle of totality, even in a more generalized form. However it is the
physical traits, i.e. the detailed characteristics of the parts of the body, those which can be exhaustively enumerated and calculated with high precision, and not the fluid ethnic characteristics rotating around a self-identity that comprise the basis for the racial classification.

The archaic linguistic classification marked out the parts of the body as logically alien to the rest of material world. The modern classification by scientific language paints a more detailed picture of the human body, while the normative language does not logically mark out the parts of the body. Again, the body-referentiality intersects in a law-like way with the self-referentiality. It is noteworthy that the cornerstone of the race classification is provided by the color distinctions - white, black, yellow, red. The knowledge of spectrum and its division into major (white, black/blue, yellow/green, red) and secondary (purple, orange, pale, roan and the like) colors belong to the basic competence of human brain and not accidentally the color classification, along with kinship terminology is particularly liable to the componential analysis of structural linguistics (cf.: Sturtevant W. C. 1968).

In this “gravitation field” between the body and the self anthroponyms enjoy the intermediary status. In archaic societies, a personal name is considered an indispensable property of one’s personality, the thing which mirrors the self and sometimes is concealed from others in fear of potential damage to the individual. Alternatively, in modern society the name is generally an empty label put upon an individual. It gives no information about his personality and, in fact, is related not so much to his self as to his bodily separateness from the others.

An important resemblance between ethnonyms, anthroponyms and kinship terms lies in the inter-subjective structure which this category of linguistic signs employ. These three categories of signs occupy an outstanding place in lexics. Due to their self-referentiality, they involve simultaneously three main types of connection between the signifier and the signified, namely designation (the association with a specific referent), indication (the association with the referent which changes in the act of speech) and expression (the association capable of supplying information about the speaker)\(^\text{15}\). In addition to these three types of relationships, ethnonyms, anthroponyms and kinship terms employ the fourth one, that of identification. This circumstance, seemingly, explains the fact that kinship terminology, ethnonyms and anthroponyms have been granted with more attention by anthropologists and ethnographers, than by linguists (Arutyunov S. 1980 : 257-264).

In the classical linguistic tradition, the communicative act involves two participants, the speaker and the addressee, who exchange messages basing on the knowledge of the code. On the contrary, the communication of kinship terms, ethnonyms and anthroponyms presumes the presence of the third interactant which may be designated *connector*. Connector effectuates the selectivity. In
the most palpable form this position is present in the web of kinship. A kinship relationship is always counted through a third person: for example, for the relationship father's brother (uncle) - brother's children, father is the connector; for the relationship grandparents - grandchildren parents and children are the connectors and so on and so forth.

Ethnonyms separate ‘us’ from ‘them’ and it is between these two acting units that the communication is set. The individual actualizes the group division by giving direction to the otherwise symmetrical link which exists between the communities and taking either the ethnocentric or the xenocentric vantage point.

Among primitive people, the person who bears a name is contrasted with the person (or a group of persons) who gives the name. On the other side, there is a latent sender of the name, i.e. an object to which the name refers. In the past, the sender of the name was always known: it might have been a living relative, a dead relative, an ancestor, an animal or a religious figure. Even nowadays the habit of naming a person after a saint with whom his birthday is associated remains quite popular. Moreover, among the Bulgarians, urban population including, naming after an older relative (grandfather, grandmother, father’s brother etc.) has survived till now. The name-giver in this situation was nothing more than a connector who passed the name from the initial bearer to the newly-born child. The sender was the actual speaker, while the recipient was the addressee.

Kinship, the naming system and ethnicity are the phenomena which drastically change historically. The triologic nature of kinship terms, ethnonyms and anthroponyms indicates that once the interpersonal relations were ‘hacked’ to the non-categorical mythems, the germs of future kinship terms, anthroponyms, ethnonyms and partonyms which were attributed and valid for a certain point in time were personal traits and qualities relevant for a pair of relatives (cf.: Dziebel G. V. 1997b). However a caveat should be introduced that none of the extant archaic societies can fully exemplify this hypothetical condition. Allegedly, genealogical categories began to emerge later as the crystallization of mythems and, in a certain historical stage, were still preserving the traits of time-oriented markers (the self-reciprocal kinship terminology).

The primordial unity of kinship and ethnicity is reflected in metaphoric biological kinship ties which exist between people sharing one ethnic identification. Kinship can not be defined exclusively via reference to biological reproduction; moreover it is first and foremost a social phenomenon, as many students of kinship have rightly asserted (cf.: Barnes J. A. 1961; Buchler I. R. 1966; Beattie J. H. M. 1964; Schneider D. M. 1964). For Ernst Gellner, kinship is a pure relationship which transcends any biological connotations as well as social variables.
"It is a connection between [the two] that constitutes much of the study of 'kinship structure’ "(Gellner E. 1973: 171).

On this level of pure relationship he juxtaposes kinship and ethnicity.

"... Two people are of the same nation if, and only if, they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation" (Gellner E. 1983 : 7).

The following scheme may serve as a visual illustration of the interdependence of body-referentiality and self-referentiality. It summarizes the above discussion of the chronotopic interdependence of sex and religiosity, age and ethnicity, generation and historicity, on the one hand, and partonyms, kinship terms, anthroponyms, ethnonyms and race names, on the other hand.

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\begin{array}{c}
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\text{ethnonyms} \\
\text{anthroponyms} \\
\text{religion} \quad \text{ethnicity} \quad \text{historicity} \\
\text{sex} \quad \text{age} \quad \text{generation} \\
\text{kinship terms} \\
\text{partonyms}
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*The Chronotopicity of Public Sphere: The Interaction Order and the Communication Order*

Goffman’s books are abundant of clichés like ‘co-presence’ and ‘in each other’s bodily presence’. Simple and self-evident as they are, they obfuscate some important aspects of interaction. Whose presence is in question? Every interaction presupposes one Ego and at least one Alter. To ascertain an Alter’s presence, it suffices for an Ego to record the latter’s body availability, and it “takes” *space*. An Ego has every reason to treat an Alter as a body-referential system since an Alter’s self-referentiality, or his expert consciousness is his environment assimilated by his body. One can not say anything about another’s expert consciousness but he can measure the temporal *distance* between his body and his self proceeding from the observation of his body-referential system. On this basis, the difference between significant others and insignificant others is made. Being assimilated, the expert consciousness still produces its effect making the Alter “sacred” or “profane”.
While ascertaining one's own presence, an Ego works with another chronotopical pattern. His body is assimilated by his self-referential system and it takes time to record its availability. In other words, the Ego experiences his own presence as the presence of the self and the presence of the Alter as the presence of the body. Thus, in the front region, people perceive others as the bodies, while themselves as the selves. In the back region, things change and the compressed self finds itself molded like the body. The only thing which is left from the others are their selves, or the impression which their talking and moving bodies regularly convey.

Joshua Meyerowitz trying to elaborate on Goffman's region classification introduces the concept of middle region which "contains elements of both the former onstage and offstage behaviors, but lacks their extremes". He exemplifies this idea with a situation when children come to an adult party and compel the adults to stop talking about money, sex, death or violence (Meyerowitz J. 1990: 77-79). Goffman himself refers to the intermediary outside region and introduces the reader into the role of intruder (Goffman E. 1959: 135).

Evidently, three patterns of self and body presence may be marked out. In the front region, the Alter's body and the Ego's self are 'in'; in the back region the Alter's body is 'out' and the Ego's body is 'in' (the deeper one gets into the back region, the bigger is the distance between his body and his self); in the middle region the Alter's body is 'around'. It can happen also in the middle region that the Ego finds himself "out of place" when, for instance, the Alter's conversation and monitoring switches over from the Ego on the third party (cf. Goffman's "alienation from interaction"). The characteristic of the middle region, then, is that the Ego's self is around, though his body is "in".

Goffman's analyses of interaction order were often criticized for the lack of attention to the structural relations within society. In the evaluation of Alvin Gouldner,

"Goffman is a social "dramaturgy" in which appearances and not underlying principles are exalted. It is a dramaturgy in which all appearances and all social claims are endowed with a kind of equal reality, however disreputable, lowly, and deviant their origin may be. In short, unlike Functionalism, it has no metaphysics of hierarchy. In Goffman's theory the conventional cultural hierarchies are shattered: for example, professional psychiatrists are manipulated by hospital inmates; doubt is cast upon the difference between the cynical and the sincere; the behavior of children becomes a standpoint for understanding adults; the behavior of criminals becomes a standpoint for understanding respectable people; the theater's stage becomes a model for understanding life. Here there is no higher and no lower" (Gouldner A. W. 1970: 378-379).

A grain of truth, certainly, is present in this heavy critique. Goffman's the front/back regionalization model should be enriched by taking into consideration what might be coined the upper region and
the lower region of public sphere. The upper and lower regions stand
for those behavioral patterns which proceed from all sorts of status
inequality from age and generation differences to class and political
hierarchies. The broadest opposition characteristic to the
upper/lower region model is that between polity and civil society.
This interplay of selves and bodies comprises the special
characteristic of public meetings, or, as Louis Quéré puts it,

“L'interaction est une affaire de positionnement réciproque des corps
et des selves dans l'espace et dans le temps de leur coprésence corporelle”
(Quéré L. 1969: 62, italics in the original).

The correlation of these elements can be the following:

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Herein an important distinction between interaction and
communication must be drawn. In the interaction order, the Ego’s self
presents itself to the Alter’s body and uses its own body as a vehicle
that actualizes the contact spatially. In the communication order, the
Ego’s self presents itself to its own body and uses the Alter’s self, in
the last resort, as a vehicle that helps to actualize the contact
temporally. In the first case, the Alter’s body is a means and the Ego’s
body is the end; in the latter case, interaction is predominately a
spatial affair and as soon as the bodies part it stops. It involves the
process of situation of the Alter’s body in space with the help of spatial
markers, or actualities. People ascertain the Alter’s presence by
making references to these markers.

First, the morphologically distinct parts of his body are marked
out and their movements in space are recorded. While in each other’s
bodily presence people focus on each other’s heads, faces, eyes, lips,
ears, or on hands, legs, shoulders etc. From time to time, these parts
move forward and retreat to the background and one can hardly
perceive the Alter’s body in its entirety. While moving in a dance, a
person sets in motion more parts of his body than in other situations
and the modern dances prompt him to be more mobile than the old
dances. However even here not all the parts can get functional
expression: for instance, it is hard to talk while moving all the other
parts of the body. Dress exposes some parts of the body and conceals
other. People try to face others’ faces and not to approach them from
the backside, unless an assault is being plotted. In the mass media
interaction, the body also is presented through its distinct parts: the
TV audience watches only the upper part of the presenter’s body; a
special ban is put on the demonstration of the private parts in the
movies; a telephonic interaction involves only mouths and ears of the
participants.
Second, the Alter’s body is situated in space by means of reference to a more detailed (“anthropological”) classification of personal “particles”: the length of the nose, the tone of the voice, the form of the lips, the color of the eyes and the hair. Third, references are made to the condition of the body (age), its functional peculiarities (sex) and its correlation with other bodies (generation). Every act of situation of the Alter’s body is possible by making comparisons between his corporeal actuality and the actuality of the Ego’s body and the bodies of other Alters. It should be taken to mean a reduction of possibilities and an increase of actualities.

Communication, on the contrary, is outstretched in time: it starts earlier than interaction and finishes later than the latter does. In a certain respect, communication may be treated as temporally unlimited: it loses its origin in the multiplicity of life situations. Communication is an ongoing process of relational linkages that the self makes with other selves. Self can not be seen in a constructivist manner, *viz.* as “made up of” or “built out of” something, it is rather a temporal process for which only befores and thereafter exist. Communication on the part of the self deals with the location of the Ego’s body in time. The body exists in a present, i.e. in time assimilated by space, whereas the self knows only a past and a future. By virtue of the heterogeneity of time, it can rapidly drop into a future and track back to a past, and none of the aforementioned spatial markers are comprehensible to it. Searching for its body’s location in time, the self can resort only to relativity patterns. The latter presumes the reduction of actualities and the increase of possibilities. It should be noted that, for the self-referential system, possibilities enjoy the status of reality to the same extent as do actualities for the body-referential system. The relativity patterns are provided by religiosity, ethnicity and historicity. If one thinks about a time when the chronotopical association between a person’s body and self occurs, i.e. at birth or at conception, no spatial markers then exist which can allow the person’s identification.

Immediate face-to-face encounters provide a ground where everything changes with the extreme spatial speed; people’s reflexivity and practicality can not grasp the emergence of actualities and they naturally set in train new ones, acting out a momentous power control over the situation. As Goffman suggests,

“In civil society the interpersonal rituals that persons accord one another while in each other’s immediate physical presence have a crucial component of official spontaneity. The giver is obliged to perform the ritual in an articulated, immediate, unthinking fashion if it is to be a valid expression of his presumed regard for the recipient, else how could this acts ‘express’ inward feelings? (Goffman E. 1991 (1961): 107).

Interaction presumes that the individual’s expert system should be *forgotten* for a moment. As Weber noted,
“...In the great majority of cases actual action goes on in a state of half-consciousness or actual unconsciousness of its subjective meaning” (Weber M. 1968 (1921): 21).

An individual should be confident in the very existence of his expert consciousness, i.e. that the oppositions will be mediated even without being deliberately pushed to this by the discursive or practical consciousness, and feel trust towards the others, i.e. be sure that they will in their own turn transform the actualities into possibilities and not pre-occupy themselves with the obsessive mediation of the already outdated oppositions.

Promising as it is, interaction order, on the other hand, harbors considerable risk. Interaction order is a battlefield of expert systems - the stronger expert system may influence and enslave the weaker. Unnoticeably a person may start to imitate and take off the units of the other’s personality and afterwards carry them around with him.18

The penetration of the units of the other’s personality accompanies the individual throughout his life and is streamlined within his expert system. Incorporation of them in childhood and in the immediate a-moment-before past is equally relevant for one’s expert system.

One may, thus, suggest that the unconscious is pertinent to public sphere and only to it. It is not the property of the actor but rather the ground of interaction between individuals. It is rooted in the fact that people perceive others and their own bodies as systems and not as environments. At the last resort, the unconscious stems from the co-dependence of body-referentiality and self-referentiality and the “bar” of which Giddens speaks is the unity of their difference. The unconscious is elaborately spatialized, or, in Jacques Lacan’s words, is structured like language, while, for the self, all the spatial markers belonging to the body-referential system are incomprehensible.

This proposition echoes a piece of Lacan’s theory of psychoanalysis which also offers a reorientation of the notion of the unconscious.

“It is the illusion that the psychotherapeutic seance invokes repressions from the past. The well-described in the psychoanalytical literature ‘reacting-back effect’, when a patient abruptly interrupts the seance, should be interpreted not as his/her stubborn reluctance to let the doctor do him/her good but as a social blunder on the part of the latter. The doctor takes advantage of the situational supremacy of his/her expert system. Moreover the doctor belongs to the category of people who are not interested in the immediate presence of the patient and do not intend to sustain a close emotional relationship with him/her. A friend of the author once made a characteristic remark: “Why should I give my confessions to a priest in the church, I better speak myself out to my mother”.
The individual’s self-referentiality, or his expert consciousness, his body-referentiality and the unconscious stand in different relations to time. The expert consciousness involves the movement from the future onto the present, the body-referential system is predominately a past-retrieving system, while the unconscious belongs to the individual’s immediate present.

Communication and interaction are the mutually dependent orders intrinsic to public sphere. For instance, a sexual interaction with the body of sex X is possible only due to the communication of the self with the body of sex Y. In the communicational order, collective actions are generated out of the linkage of the participants’ back regions, while in the interaction order the front regions of the participants are linked to produce collective actions.

Nevertheless the cultural heterogeneity of mankind permits to claim that the interaction order and the communication order can acquire unequal representation in different social systems.
Part III. The Heterogeneity of Social Systems: At the Backstage of Modernity

The Chronotope of Russia as Seen Through the Social Movements

In the following the author will attempt at eliciting certain aspects of Russia's chronotope. Following Alaine Touraine\(^1\), the author sees social movements as an important source of information about the societal conflicts which bear strong connection to the time-space reality of a society.

On the Notion of Social Movement

As yet, voluminous literature has appeared on the problem of conceptual definition of the social movement. Mario Diani attempted at synthesizing various formulations and spelled out three basic components of social movement, namely networks of relations between the plurality of actors, collective identity and conflictual issues (Diani M. 1992 : 17). It is reasonable, following John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, to make a distinction between three analytical levels in the evocative appellation 'social movement': the social movement proper, i.e. a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represent preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society; the social movement organization, i.e. a complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement and attempts to implement those goals; and social movement industry, i.e. a multiplicity of social movement organizations aiming at the attainment of the broadest preferences of a social movement (McCarthy J. D., Zald M. N. 1977 : 1217-1219).

The new social movements (feminism, the greens, anti-war waves etc.) are opposed to the old social movements epitomized by the worker's movement of the turn of the centuries. The means and ends of the new social movements are located within the civil society and not within the polity; "their concern is less with citizenship, and hence with political power, than with the cultural sphere, their focus being on values and life-styles" (Scott A. 1990 : 16). Their organization is not
formal, institutionalized and hierarchical but is based on networks and grass-roots participation. They adopt not the political mobilization but the direct action strategy which brings about cultural innovations (Scott A. 1990: 19).

The new social movements "try to realize the new way of living not via the state, but via the individual and society through personal transformation, new forms of relationships, a new culture.... " (Nelles 1984 : 429, cited in Scott A. 1990: 157). They embody the spirit of civil society as a self-organizing and self-conscious structure located outside of both the family and the institutional framework of the state (cf.: Frentzel-Zagorska J. 1990). They may be viewed as an attempt at a systemic transformation of the long-time patterns of the relationships with nature, state and cultural value systems. A Giddensian formula that in the condition of modernity identity becomes a “reflexive project” (Giddens A. 1990) finds itself in full agreement with the development of the new social movements.

Seemingly, the typology of the new social movements does not comprise a significant line in the theoretical considerations on the topic in question. An attempt at such a classification was made by Giddens who correlates free speech / democratic movements, labor movements, peace movements and ecological movements respectively with four institutional dimensions of modernity, namely surveillance (control of information and social supervision), capitalism, military power and industrialism, to which they direct their criticisms (Giddens A. 1991 : 59, 159). A notable trait of this typology - and simultaneously its main disadvantage - is the downplay of feminism and counterculture movements. For feminism, Giddens reserves a footnote, while counterculture movements are merged with the greens. However his effort to group the new social movements in one scheme is praiseworthy and representative of a general focus these phenomena have deserved in scientific treatment.

An Outline of the Transformational Movements in Russia

An analysis of social movements in Russia is convenient to make with reference to the general processes of sociopolitical change. A good beginning for the discussion is provided by Peter The Great’s transformation of the XVIII century. Unlike the European Enlightenment, the Russian Enlightenment can be easily traced back to the specific dates and accomplishments due to the fact that they were brought about by an attempt of a single - though endowed by the royal power - individual. To put Peter The Great’s reform in a nutshell, it westernized a bulk of traditional Russian everyday customs (the beards were forcefully cut, the wigs came to cover the heads of the servicemen, the calendar was changed etc.), modernized Russian political institutions and military industry and renewed the upper class by means of “lifting” a good number of talented people from the bottoms of the society. The main objective of this drastic change was
the critique of the “Asian” component in Russian society and political culture.

Peter The Great’s transformation was the strongest and the most successful effort on the part of the Tzarist power in Russia to improve the internal structure of the empire. Since then and well into the XX century Tzarism has always been the object of the societal critique. XIX century in Russia was marked by several waves of public discontent which fit well into the definition of the social movement. Soon after the Napoleon War of 1812, a group of Russian military officers which belonged to the gentry class started an underground campaign against the government. In their opinion, Russia needed more Westernization and now it concerned the problems of republic and serfdom. The latter, unlike European countries, had not been yet abolished and acted as a chief hindrance to the economic development in Russia. On the basis of a number of secret societies scattered in the central regions of Russia, the gentry revolutionaries organized in 1825 a mutiny in St. Petersburg which, however, was suppressed. Addressing the historical significance of the gentry reformatory activity, Vladimir Lenin wrote

“The circle of these revolutionaries was narrow, they were desperately remote from the common people but their deal would not be forgotten...”.

The middle-class intelligentsia was the next to enter the arena of sociopolitical struggle. From 1860 to 1895, three main directions of societal critique were spelled out, namely the propagandist, the anarchist and the conspiratorial. The propagandists saw their vocation in explaining to common people through leaflets and proclamations all the predicament of their condition. The anarchists who rejected all forms of political power used to render direct help to peasants by working in the country as doctors, teachers and local administrators. These collective actions were known as ‘an exodus to the countryside’ (hozhdeniye v narod). Contrary to the first two trends in the middle-class reformative activity, the third one was that of terrorism. The conspirators organized the attacks on the representatives of the extant governmental agencies and in 1883 assassinated the Tzar himself. With all the middle-class revolutionary groups, Russian rural peasant community living in the conditions of serfdom was praised as a convenient foundation for building socialism in future. They meant only to emancipate it from the state’s oppression.

In 1895 the Communist Party led by Lenin was formed in Russia and the period of the workers’ movement organized under the Marxist slogans began. It is a pretty well known fact that in 1917 the workers seized the power and laid the foundation for the Socialist Russia. It is important to note here that the Russian workers’ movement was the only old social movement which succeeded in attaining its goals totally. The social movement transformed itself into
a political structure. In the course of two centuries, the transformational initiatives in Russia were passed over in a turn-taking manner from the Tzar to the gentry, from the gentry to the middle-class intellectuals, and from the middle-class intellectuals to the workers. All the vertical levels of the society had taken part in this global change and ultimately the outcome of this long-time process lost all the connections with the meaning of the original impulse. In 1985 Gorbachev launched perestroika which was a fundamental retreat from the political and social values of socialism. The ideas of Western capitalism and democracy has become very popular in Russia and after 1989 formed the guidelines of Yeltzin’s state policy. The dismantling of the iron curtain cut all the countries of the former Soviet bloc off the “Elder Brother” and opened the way to a process known as ‘The Transition’.

Social Movements in the Soviet Epoch

Needless to say that the Soviet times were void of social movements and social movement organizations, with the informal organizations (The Russian Women’s Committee, The Monument Protection Society, The Army and Navy Voluntary Assistants Society etc.), often highly politicized, comprising their only substitutions. Probably, the grains of a new social movement can be attributed to the dissident preferences which started to mushroom after the “Khruschev Spring” in the late 1960s and well into the 1980s. However their only weapons were apathy and the backbiting of the government. A representative confession is adduced below:

“Most of us, irrespectively of intelligence, education, age and position, remained infantile youngsters, egocentric and capricious. We put ourselves in the center of the world and believed that the communists had treated us badly but were not able to specify in what respect concretely. We hoped that our future coming to the West will bring us a compensation, the fate will give us its excuses and reward with shiny toys” (Klimontovich N. 1995 : 95).

Paradoxically, with respect to the pre-perestroika times, one may speak solely of the petty Indianist movement as an epitome of new social movements in the Western sense of the term. The author gave a detailed description of this movement elsewhere (Dziebel G. V. 1997a; see also: Smith S. S. 1995) and here only several important aspects will be highlighted.

Indianism is the organized adherence and practical appropriation of the cultural values of American Indians. It harks back to the early image of noble sauvage found in the intellectual oeuvre of the Enlightenment (Rousseau, Voltaire). Currently, the Indianist movement numbers about 300 people from about 30 towns in the former Soviet Union. They annually gather for a countryside rally called Pow-Wow and then scatter into small local interest groups.
The history of the Indianist movement in Russia may be divided into four stages. The first stage spans the period from the end of the 1960s to 1979 and is characterized by early contacts between individuals and small companies of friends confined to their localities. The second stage (1980-1984) is renowned for the communal, or Pow-Wow solidarity which imbued Indianists. The years 1985-1986 may be marked out as a third period of the Indianist community development. Total consciousness was outmoded at that time by the formation of small and stable groups.

Striving to reach a full fusion with nature and the Indian way of life, people from Ukraine, Novosibirsk and St. Petersburg founded rural settlements in the Altai Mountains and in the Crimea Peninsula. In 1986, on the wave of an extensive mass media campaign, several Indianist activists formed the Leonard Peltier Support Group in St. Petersburg whose main concern was an assistance in setting free from an American prison one of the leaders of the American Indian Movement. Small manifestations, collecting of signatures, consultations with lawyers, meetings with the members of a like-minded group from the U.S. led by Leonard Peltier’s wife, petitions to the governmental structures formed the range of the actions of this group. By 1989 it exhausted the resources of action and ceased to exist.

The period of 1987-1990 forms the fourth stage which was characterized by a 75% increase in the Indianist membership. By all means, this process bears connection to the sociopolitical changes initiated in Russia at that time. More social freedom, more means of advertisement, more access to international contacts became available. Many serious books on Indian culture and spirituality started to mushroom in Russia. Russian cinema and video markets were being filled with movies which authentically portrayed Indian cultural heritage and historical fate. In their turn, the literature and the movies were launched by the overall tendency to reassess the modernistic attitude towards indigenous population and nature, which had emerged in the Euro-American society after World War II.

The third stage can be viewed as a revival and redoubling of the communal solidarity of the second phase which likewise was followed by group and individual segregation and group and individual undertakings (1991-1996). In 1990 Indianists started a big publishing campaign which gave rise to a good amount of officially recognised journals, among which *Iktomi* (published in Moscow since 1994), *Tomahawk* (Syktyvykar, 1990-1994), *American Indian News* (Moscow, 1990-1993) and *The First Americans* (St. Petersburg, since 1996) occupy a pre-eminent place, and Russian translations of the classical ethnographic literature on North American Indians (*North American Indians* series). About the same time, The Band of Indian Dances and Songs was formed on the basis of the St. Petersburg group with several invited participants from Moscow, Minsk and Ukraine. Due to sponsorship, the band succeeded in making a tour to Siberia but
afterwards its scale was restricted to occasional performances during Pow-Wows and other Indianists’ gatherings.

Starting from 1990, Indianists began to participate in two American Indian actions called The Indian Run. The Indian Run represents a campaign to protect moribund nature and vanishing indigenous people. It took the form of bus convoys throughout North America, Europe and Asia. Following the ancient Indian myths and religious practices, the participants of the march were supposed to cover part of the distance by running with an Indian symbol in their hands. People from the U.S., different European and Asian countries, members of the indigenous communities (e.g. Ainu), enrolled in this campaign, pursued their own interests which sometimes bore no connection to the ideas initially put into the movement by Indians.

Indianism is not exclusively a Russian phenomenon. Similar groups exist in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, to a less extent in Finland, Denmark, Holland, Wales and other West European countries. It should be pointed out that it is in countries of the former Socialist bloc that the strongest development of the Indianist movement is recorded. Moreover, the independent emergence of Indianism in Russia during the period of Communism characterized by the unparalleled political and informational closeness presents a sheer puzzle.

Indianism aligns with the mood of ecological movements (cf., for example, the participation in the Indian Run, the foundation of the rural settlements), but “the reds” are able to provide the greens with a humanistic background. The pivotal point of their criticism is the condemnation of the destruction of series of native cultures. Indianism is close to the movements of Hippies, Punks and other youth counterculture movements, bears some resemblance to the religious sectarianism, and borders with the modern revivalist ethnic movements. Lacking any blood or territorial ties with the American Indians, Indianists, nonetheless, strive to resurrect, protect and advertise traditional cultural values of the moribund nation. They follow the same line of the nation identity construction that today is pursued by all the indigenous peoples. To prove this statement, a reference can be made to the current situation found among the Huron Indians:

“When I compared the characteristics of this neo-Huron culture with the culture depicted in the historic records, most of the modern traits, virtually everything, were “counterfeit”: the folklore articles, the hair style, the moccasins, the “Indian” parade costumes, the canoes, the pottery, the language, the music” (Roosens E. E. 1989: 46-47).

Multifarious connections to the collective action patterns of modernity comprise the general peculiarity of the Indianist movement. They do not, however, erode its palpable distinctiveness to the effect that it may be treated as phenomenon in its own right. By and large, they stand apart from the perennial Russian disputes about Western
and Slavic (or, even stronger, Asian) destinies of the nation, exert a broad critique against the current development of the advanced societies and appeal to the relevance of the primordial basis of the human commonwealth.

Despite small membership, Indianism bears all the traits of the new social movement: it reflects certain preferences, reveals a network-type organizational structure, possesses its own industry, is located within the public sphere and aims at reassessing cultural values and constructing new identities. Typically for the new social movements, it captures

“the interactional process through which actors with different identities and orientations come to elaborate a shared system of beliefs and a sense of belongingness, which exceeds by far the boundaries of any single group or organisation, while maintaining at the same time their specificity and distinctive features” (Diani M. 1992: 14).

Social Movements in the Transitional Period

The collapse of Communism fostered the importation of the Western-type new social movements in Russia but, as it usually happens with the borrowings from the West, they can not fit into the current Russian reality. A student of the sociopolitical activity of Russian women rightly states that “there is no real feminism as yet” (Jürna I. : 492). However there are evidences that the women’s movements in Russia can be traced out though they does not assume typical Western forms. The factual material comes from the author’s field research among the Erzya-Mordvinians.

In the patriarchal Mordvinian society of the XIX century woman was treated by men as economically equal, politically subordinate and socially pre-eminent. The latter means that the traditional Mordvinian culture was female-oriented with woman standing in the focus of various ritual practices, religious beliefs and social norms. Men’s dominance, being very palpable, lacked, however, the stability, firmness and deep-rootedness since the essence of the societal experience belonged to women. Being in the focus of the societal attention, however biased it has always been, the woman managed to absorb a great deal of social energy enabling her to exercise a sort of subterranean control over the social reality.

Researchers have noticed that oppressed groups - and women in the first place - tend to be more “in their bodies” than the oppressive groups (Adelson L. A. 1989 : 164) and, thus, more concentrated and viable. Naturally, it may be expected that in the times, when the traditional (in the broadest sense of the word) male-dominated way of life collapses, women can use the energy absorbed through the centuries of oppression in order to increase their role in the society and become “visible”. At least, this has happened in Euro-American society where the modernity crisis opened up the way for women’s aggrandizement.
Among the Mordvinians, first changes occurred after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 when the extended families governed by patriarchs broke up and the young generations started to build separate houses and live independently. To be true, this process commenced even earlier with the penetration of industrialization into the Mordvinian villages but, during the Tzarist regime in Russia, separate allots were given only to the young males who wished to reside apart from their parents and grandparents; daughters of the families were never assigned with allots. The collapse of the patriarch family life which in Russia was brought about by two successive waves of modernization (the late Tzarist and the Bolshevik ones) is paralleled by the similar processes which had begun in Europe earlier in the XIX century (cf.: (Giddens A. 1992)).

The most significant changes in the position of the Mordvinian woman occurred during recent perestroika times. The collapse of the socialist economy has caused the aggravation of the collective farms. In the last several years, the collective farms ceased to receive subsidies from the provincial administration, though they regularly yield the required amount of foodstuffs into the federal budget. Men who work in the collective farms receive no money; moreover, they are not able to move away in order to find jobs in the towns since in this case they would lose their right to housing in the village. Consequently, the alcoholism rates among them are extremely high. Young males have to make their choice between fleeing away into the towns and staying in their home villages without the possibility to earn money but with the probability to go to seed through drink.

The only group of people who receives cash salaries now are the educational and cultural workers, because they are financed by the federal and not by the local governmental structures. These sectors are everywhere led by women and the Mordvinian society forms no exclusion here. Consequently, the sole key for economic prosperity in the villages is kept by women.

Additionally, the central position of woman in the traditional world of social values has turned into the concentration of the Mordvinian ethnic peculiarities within the female milieu. In the situation, when traditional and socialist economic and political structures collapsed, the ethnic culture (primarily, language, women’s crafts and folklore), remains the only constituent part of the Mordvinian world. Mordvinian women are nowadays the main keepers of traditional values and these values involve the memories of the old political mechanisms as well. Thus, the mighty power holders today are old women who exert their control over the village life by public opinion and gossiping, making references to the old political value system of the patriarchal type but now in their own women’s interests.

As a result of severe economic stagnation in modern Russian countryside, the “breeze of life” blows only from the cultural sphere and it takes the form of Mordvinian national revival led by the social movement Mastor-Ava (Motherland). Women are the vanguard of this
revivalist tendency: they organize local museums and folklore concerts, participate in international folklore sessions, keep in contact with Mordovia. To use Mary Douglas’s famous phrase, men (and not women) are “the matter out of place” at the current stage of Mordvinian sociopolitical development.

A confession made by a 36-year old librarian in Old Shentala village, an active member of the folklore group, seems quite representative regarding the current gender situation among the Mordvinians:

“My husband who works on the tractor heavily disapproves my involvement into these folklore activity. He prefers to see me sitting at home or walking around the cow. But I feel myself firm: I have enough time to do my home tasks, to give away the books and to sing and dance as well. My engagement in the all-village life makes me stronger and I always have what to tell my husband in response to his pretensions. Finally, it is me who brings cash into our family and this is because I do not stay at home. We often quarrel with my husband and I would be happy to send him away and to bring my children up alone. I can not do this because in the village everything is done through the attitude of the old women and they would never approve this decision” (author’s field notes).

An important conclusion can be made about the fusion of ethnic revivalization process with the feminist movement. The Mordvinian case is not an exclusion: the similar situation may be observed in other national provinces of the Russian Federation.

Generally, the difference between new social movements in Russia and new social movements in the West lies in the following. Russia witnesses the strong revivalization and self-determination process on the part of national minorities, on one hand, and on the part of Russian ethnus, on the other hand. The former can be seen in the split-up of the Soviet Union and in the formation of various national minority sociopolitical groups (for example, the Tum movement in Khakassia, Mastor-Ava in Mordovia, Ruch in Ukraine to name the few). The latter usually appeals to the fact that in the Soviet times Russian ethnus lacked its national capital distinct from the capital of the Soviet Union and its own Academy of Science. The most famous organization which reflects this current revivalisation (to be true, also chauvinistic) preferences is the national patriotic front Pamyat’ (Memory); on the political level, this tendency has affected the Liberal Social Democratic Party (V. Zhirinovsky), the Communist Party (G. Zyuganov) and the Labor Party. These national movements could be hardly found in pre-Revolutionary Russia where the maintenance of national entirety was the part of the Tzarist policy. First of all, it concerned the Jews who were kept within the Pale of Settlement and intimidated by the pogroms of the governmental agency called Black Hundred. The critique exerted by these new ethnic movements is immutably directed against the globalization and the suppression of differences instigated by the Bolsheviks.
Another process which deserves being treated in connection with the new social movements is the revitalization of religiosity in Russia. The reacquisition of belief (not necessarily the Orthodox belief) forms nowadays a strong set of social preferences. Naturally, it could not be expected neither in pre-Revolutionary Russia, nor in the Soviet Union. One may not speak about the organizational structure inherent to this new social movement in view of the fact that this structure does already exist in the form of the Church. This religiosity movement is based on the idea of reunion with the Church and treats the Soviet-born atheism as the central point of its critique.

With respect to both ethnic and religiosity movements, it is important that, like new social movements in the West, they stem from the public sphere. They are first and foremost social movements and hence should be bracketed from the religious movements proper and from nationalism as a celebration by a nation of its currently relevant ethnic values.

Finally, the transformational processes of the XX century Russia fill in the space reserved for the Western-like social movements. The green and the feminist ideologists can not be too popular in Russia because there are other problems which deserve the utilization of collective action mechanisms.

The Time-Space Interpretation of the Character of Russian Social Movements

What can be observed in both new and old social movements in Russia, is their palpably temporalized character. They are either future-building or past-restoring movements. The Bolshevik Revolution aimed at building the “bright future” and in the same time drew strongly on the communistic experience of the early man; the current transformation intends to correct the past mistakes and construct another time-space myth of Russian development; the ethnic movements appeal to the old cultural values and try to resurrect them; the splash of religiosity harks back to the traditional symbols of the Orthodox Church; the tiny Indianist movement with the needle-like thrust abnegates the values fostered in the course of the historical development of mankind.

By and large, social movements in Russia embody three self-referential temporal modes: historicity, ethnicity and religiosity. Historicity here involves the continuity and interchangeability of polity and private sphere, polity and economy and polity and household, upper classes and lower classes. It is noteworthy how clearly-cut were the class divisions of the Tzarist society to the effect that each of them, in a strict chronological sequence, made its distinctive contribution to the transformational process, and how easily and deliberately they were erased after the Bolshevik revolution. The uniqueness of the Soviet State as the one which was built by means of tearing to shreds the class structure should also be
stressed. The historicity of Russian society finds its expression also in the accumulation of cultural symbols belonging to different epochs. A brief look on the current holiday calendar can provide a vivid example. Russians have preserved the Soviet holidays, redefined them to meet the demands of the new times (e.g. The Day of the Great October Socialist Revolution turned into The Day of Unity and Consent) and added main Orthodox celebrations as well. Seemingly, only in Russia people celebrate Christmas, The New Year and The Old New Year. Another puzzling fact is the present status of St. Petersburg as the administrative center of Leningrad Province.

Using the Goffmanian theoretical framework, the temporalized new social movements in Russia can be located in the back region of public sphere. Ethnic movements, religiosity movements and transformational movements reinterpret the deeply-rooted individual and societal principles of behavior. They widen the range of possibilities and reduce the sphere of actualities, thus developing the relational patterns of communication between the self-referential and body-referential systems.

The active, strong and well-developed back region of Russian public sphere can also be vividly demonstrated by historical facts. In the XVII century, the Polish intervention resulted in the seizure of Moscow and occupation of the part of the country to the West from the capital. It was stopped and the Poles were driven away only by the levies led by Minin and Pozharsky. In the Napoleon War of 1812, Russians had chosen the strategy of decoying the French troops deep into the homeland and even had given Moscow away without a battle. However, being exhausted by the skirmishes with partisans and short of supplies, the French army was finally wiped away. During the World War II, the fascists were let deep into the Russian hinterland, heroically stopped in Moscow suburbs and then defeated. Each time when the back region of Russian public sphere was disturbed by an armed outsider, the Russians proved to be irresistible. Western armies invariably chose the opposite strategy, namely that of Bliz Krieg.

In its movements to the West, Russia rarely met success. It could only happen providing the earlier mobilization of their back region, as it was the case in the course of the Napoleon War and the World War II. However the Western expansion of Russian state has never been durable and this can be viewed as a consequence of the weakness of the front region of Russian public sphere. Quite the opposite, early Russian expansion to the East brought plenty of land, meek subjects and the abundance of resources. As yet it is in Oriental world that Russian economical and political influence has been really strong. Applying the front/back region model, one can also refer the fact that European countries had all their colonies overseas, while Russian state colonized only those lands which bordered on its territory.

If one looks back to two relatively recent split-ups within Christianity, namely the Reformation in Europe and the Schism in
Russia brought about by Peter The Great’s church reform, he will observe an important difference between these two ostensibly similar processes. While Protestants burst into the world arena, offered a new and powerful philosophy of life, attained dominance in several European countries and “built” America, Russian old-believers retreated into the country’s marginal areas (mostly, to Siberia and Volga River Basin), scattered in small communities and made their best to retain the “original spirit of Orthodoxy”. In these examples, the adherence to the back (in the case of Russian old-believers) or front (in the case of Protestants) regions was both a social process and a geographical movement. The economic factor did not play here the decisive role, since the old-believers made a significant contribution to the capital accumulation process in Russia necessary for the capitalist development. It is chronotopicity of public sphere that, seemingly, accounts for the difference between Russian and Western consequences of the early religious movements.

The active nature of the back region of Russian public sphere also may be observed in the economic organization of the Soviet Union. David Stark’s comment is here quite unambiguous:

“The alternative account breaks with these state-centered views and challenges the dominant conception of state socialism and an atomized society. Through ethnographic studies and survey research sociologists have identified a multiplicity of social relations that did not conform to officially prescribed hierarchical patterns. These relations of reciprocity and market-like transactions were widespread inside the socialist sector as well as in the “second economy” and stemmed from the contradictions of attempting to “scientifically manage” an entire national economy. At the shop-floor level, shortages and supply bottlenecks led to bargaining between supervisors and informal groups; at the managerial level, the task of meeting plan targets required a dense network of informal ties that cut across enterprises and local organizations; and the allocative distortions of central planning of reproduced the conditions for the predominantly part-time entrepreneurship of the second economies that differed in scope, density of network connections, and conditions of legality across the region” (Stark D. 1992: 4-5).

Another perspective is provided by analyzing the chronotopicity of public sphere in terms of upper region/back region. Traditionally, the lower region of the public sphere in Russia was represented by peasantry which had been tightly bound to communal forms of economic production and social life. The survivals of serfdom, which was officially abolished in 1861 (much later than in the majority of European countries), by 1917 still constituted a hindrance to the rural economic development. The progressive Stolypin reform of 1906-1910 aimed at ultimate destruction of Russian obschina and opening the way to free capitalist farming but was stopped short by the land-lords’ lobby in the governmental circles. Bolsheviks preserved rural communality by introducing collective farms (kolhozes and sovhozes), thus again putting a ban on free enterprise in the countryside. Even
today a sort of serfdom still exists by virtue of the fact that peasants do not receive salaries for their work in the collective farms but can not leave the collective farms because in this case the collective farms will expropriate their houses. 

Before Peter The Great, the class of peasants was opposed to the class of hereditary aristocracy (boyare). At first Ivan The Terrible (1533-1584) and then Peter The Great destroyed this class and replaced it with the gentry class (dvoryane). Peter The Great also set in train the process of formation of Russian intelligentsia and the bureaucratic stratum. The upper region of public sphere, as it was shown above, initiated social movements in Russia in the XIX century. The class of workers gradually emerged as a result of the capitalist development and entered the class structure of the upper region opposed to the peasantry. By 1895 and well into the XX century, the upper region of public sphere consolidated in the union of Marxist intellectuals and socially nascent workers. Taking into consideration the failures of the middle-class social movement of 1860-1895 which emphasized the role of peasantry in the transformation of Russia, Lenin relied upon the workers’ class as the main engine of the future revolution and reserved for the “rustic and benighted” peasantry the place of the workers’ “allies”.

The deconstruction of the class system of the Tzarist Russia after the Revolution of 1917 led to the vertical de-regionalization of the public sphere. Russian citizens were all laid under the pressure of the Communist ideology and party apparatus. The boundaries of the public sphere were not clearly delineated and its fusion with the polity was expressed in the famous Party slogan “The nation and the Party are inseparable”. Russian citizens passively sustained the legitimacy of the all-permeating order.

The logic of chronotope also suggests that the spatial projection of the Russian transformational movements is present as well. The spatiality of Russian collective actions is compressed to the effect that the ecological, labor, peace and democratic endeavors are located and controlled by the polity and it is from the polity that they are sent down into the public sphere. Thus, the workers’ party seized the power in 1917 and was holding it till 1989; the democratic liberties were introduced in 1985-1989 into the public sphere without any pressure from the inside of society; the disarmament campaign was also started by the polity under Gorbachev in view of the weakness of state economy.

Similar regularities can be observed in the ecological and women’s movements in contemporary Russia: the weakness of grass-root tendencies is set off against the development of elite groups (Jürna I.; Yanitsky O. 1996). As the Mordvinian example shows, women’s grass-root activity in the country-side is not directly oriented to the women’s problems but aims at resolving the conflicts in the ethnocultural sphere. In the same way, one of the chief grass-root organization among Russian women, namely the Movement of
Soldier’s Mothers, is interested not in the immediate gender problems but in the situations affecting a woman’s closest relatives.

**The Heterogeneity of Public Spheres**

In the following the author will draw a line of comparison between the public sphere in Russia and the public sphere in the West and propose a general evolutionary scheme of the public sphere transformation.

Early modernity, as some authors (Bell D. 1978; Berman M. 1982: 107-110) rightly assert, is connected with a drastic change in the chronotope. Space has been colonized (accumulated) and time has been spatialized (“saved”)\(^{25}\). The clock-time is actually the only time reality which is absent in nature, even though the claim is made that it is the most correct representation of natural time. Social relations underwent spatialization as well. David Harvey suggests that

> “the problem with Enlightenment thought was not that it had no conception of ‘the other’ but that it perceived ‘the other’ as necessarily having (and sometimes ‘keeping to’) a specific *place* in a spatial order that was ethnocentrically conceived to have homogeneous and absolute qualities” (Harvey D. 1995 (1990): 252, italics in the original).

It is widely stressed that Western civil society presumes the [temporal] sequestration from the polity, economy and household:

> “The sociological variant of civil society refers to a *space or arena between household and state*, other than the market, which affords possibilities of concerted action and social self-organisation” (Bryant Ch. G. A. 1993: 399, italics in the original).

Meanwhile, the spatial borders of Western civil society protrude far beyond the national limits due to the globalization processes which have taken three phases, namely the physical, economical and informational colonization. The ecological, democratic, peace and labor movements lie along the spatial dimensions of the society each having its own “corner”. The clash of civilizations constitutes the principal conflict to which the efforts of these movements are directed. Western new social movements pursue the goal of mitigating the consequences of modernity and al-location of the diversified variables of the latter within the societal borders. However the impact of modernity on the regions outside the Euro-American civilization is safe from their criticism.

Public sphere which in Russia takes form of the relational continuity between the temporalized levels of society and the
temporalized layers of cultural meanings, in the West is inseparable from the spatial actualities of globalization.

It is the difference in the time-space characteristics of the new social movements that hampered Giddens’ attempt to situate feminism and the counterculture movements within his typology. The temporality of Western society is compressed to the same extent as its spatiality is unfolded. The above mentioned movements are oriented primarily on the front region of public sphere and aim at redefining the patterns of day-to-day routine interactions when people find themselves in each other’s bodily presence and the indicators of gender, generation and age become the primary objects of mutual monitoring.

Generally, in late modernity, the spatialized perspective on social actors has been outmoded by the multiplicity of standards. Alongside feminist and counterculture movements, this process is reflected in the emancipation of sexual relations, the development of the culture of free sexual encounters and establishment of ‘pure relationships’ (Giddens A. 1990a: 88-98). The freedom of sexual encounters is surrounded by a halo of vicarious indications to sex. Pornographic movies and literature, sex shops, bordellos, night clubs, eroticized public services, group sex, the propaganda of various make-love techniques etc. create a multiplicity of alluring perspectives. The mass media in general is a fertile ground for the generation of interactive interpretations. Belaboring of the multiplicity of standards within the post-modernist tradition in sociology and its codification in the formula ‘anything goes’ is, then, quite understandable and burning. It marks the liberation of public sphere from the spatialized markers and introduction of temporalized patterns. As it was argued above, the self can locate the body only by means of relational patterns, the spatialized markers being unintelligible for it.

The preponderant dissimilarity between Western and Russian public spheres lies in the difference in distribution of activity and passivity between the front and back and the upper and lower regions of the public sphere. The social movements in the West are grounded in the active character of the front and lower regions of public sphere and the passivity of the back and upper regions, whereas their Russian counterparts stem from the activity of the back and upper regions and the passivity of the front and lower regions. One may observe the curvature of the spatial organization of the public sphere: the compressed spatiality is edged out of the front region into the upper region, while the compressed temporality moves from the back region into the lower region.

From this point of view, it becomes clear why Russia, being constantly shaken up by societal cataclysms, always looks like a stagnant and conservative country. Tradition and change, irrespective of the country, simply reside in different regions of public sphere. Since the reforms of Peter The Great, Russia is undergoing the gradual
transition from the active back-region pattern to the active front region pattern. This tendency was intersected by the drastic transformation of the upper/lower region relationship instigated by the Bolshevik revolution.

The Western way of changing the upper/lower region relationship is that of stepwise, long-term amendment. It is contrasted with the momentary change in front/back region pattern brought about by Enlightenment. The expanded temporality of the back region was accommodated in the present. Christian dogmatics were, in fact, rejected in favor of an older tradition dating back to the body-referentiality of ancient Greece. This gave birth to a rational and modular actor enjoying a strong front region, oriented on bodily interaction and not on self-communication and acting only for the purpose of reproduction of his individualistic structures. Ernst Gellner gives his accurate portrait:

‘Modular man can combine into effective associations and institutions, without these being total, many-stranded, underwritten by ritual, and made stable through being linked to a whole set of relationships, all of these then being tied with each other and so immobilized. He can combine into specific purpose, ad hoc, limited associations, without binding himself by some blood ritual.... This is civil society: the forging of links which are effective even though they are flexible, specific, instrumental. Society is a structure, it is not atomized, helpless and supine, and yet the structure is readily adjustable and responds to rational criteria of improvement....

Modularity is the precondition of civil society and... it is itself the fruit of Protestantism. It was Protestantism which, on this theory, had taught men to stand alone, to be bound by their word without the benefit of reinforcing ritual and communal context. Protestantism, by making the absence of ritual into its own most potent ritual, and the absence of graven images into its most suggestive fetish, liberated mankind, or rather, a segment of mankind, from that addiction to audio-visual and socio-contextual reinforcement which is so characteristic of most of humanity, and which had prevented the emergence of that modern world to which we are now committed, and whose most valued political features are associated with the notion of civil society” (Gellner E. 1995: 41-42, 45-46).

Alternatively, in Russia structures are necessary only as a means of events reproduction. This can be observed in the way the Russians treat the structural innovations coming from the West: at first, they delve into them with furious enthusiasm and then, cast them away or pervert so much that nobody is able to recognize them. The following proverbial phrase is attributed to Peter the Great:

“We need Europe for a couple of decades. Then we can turn our back to it” (Klyuchevsky V. 1990: 218).

Or as an American political commentator expressed himself with respect to Russian Parliamentary elections in 1995,
“...This campaign is beginning to look like a Soviet propagandist worst caricature of the American democratic process” (The New York Times, 17 November 1995).

Russia needs democratic novelties firstly as a means of reproducing its temporalized events and only secondly for the up-to-date benefit of its actors. Actors themselves in Russia are seen as events, big or small, important or trifle, beneficial or disastrous. As the long history of authoritarianism and totalitarianism in Russia shows, the role of individual actor has always been extremely important. Needless to remind that all the transformations found in Russian history are tightly connected with particular personalities such as Peter The Great, Lenin, Stalin, Gorbachev, Yeltzin who could lead the world astray in the blink of an eye. Like the event, a Russian actor is considered to be moved by a certain uncontrollable force and his image is immutably surrounded by a halo of supernatural (God’s or devil’s) blessing.

At the other extreme, the primitive societies are generally characterized by the development of communication order. By their myths, rituals, practices and beliefs which are usually labeled ‘superstitions’ by Europeans, they colonize a huge realm of possibilities which deepen the past and stretch the future. They have created time and left Europeans to entertain its reproduction in space. Their life is a powerful prophecy which has come to be true with modernity.

This may be demonstrated by the following example.

In the closing of the XIX century, Wowoka, an American Indian of the Paiute tribe, had initiated a religion which soon embraced a bulk of tribes from the Paiute in the Far West to the Sioux on the Great Plains. According to Wowoka’s teaching, if Indians started to perform certain kinds of ceremonies, which had come to Wowoka in dreams and visions, all the dead Indians would have come back and live again on the earth in perennial bliss and prosperity; on the contrary, all the whites would be wiped away in a terrible cataclysm. For this upheaval, the prophet predicted a fixed date in December 1890.

By that moment, most Indians had already been moved to reservations and the Sioux were the only tribe left which was still enjoying freedom. The religious movement in question took the form of a peaceful and benign enterprise with the majority of the Indians. Alternatively, the Sioux who had a strongly developed military culture infused the new religion with aggression and warlike spirit. Finally, at the end of December 1890 a large group of the Sioux was massacred by American troops at the Battle of Wounded Knee. This battle is rightly considered by historians as well as by the Indians to be the most bloody in the history of the Wild West conquest (over 250 Indians were killed). It eliminated the remnants of Indian liberty, since the last bands of the Native Americans were driven onto reservations.

At the first glance, Wowoka’s prophecy turned to be a horrendous hocus-pocus, rather than God’s truth. However, behind
this line of plain historical facts lies a logic which reveals the absolute correctness of Wowoka’s prediction. Proper comprehension of the situation is provided by the fact that in many Indian cultural traditions the whites were seen as the original inhabitants of the other world, i.e. the dead. Their sudden coming from overseas where allegedly no alive Indians could live, the color of their skins and the mysterious objects which they had in their possession and could easily handle - all contributed to this Indian interpretation. Naturally enough, who else could live overseas but the dead Indians themselves.

The asymmetry between the self-referentiality and the body-referentiality, or between myth and life, becomes visible, if one takes the standpoint of the opposite party in the story of American conquest. Tracing the roots of capitalism in the nature of Protestant ethic, Max Weber came to the following conclusion:

“For even at the threshold of its appearance, asceticism showed its Janus-face: on the one hand, abnegation of the world, and on the other, mastery of the world by virtue of the magical power obtained by abnegation” (Weber M. 1991 : 327).

Early Protestants acted out a new opposition, that of individual action and its outcome for the others, while the opposition of religious forms and their contents was brought to naught. The new opposition, initially insignificantly small, rapidly unfolded in a myriad of other oppositions of great scope and impact which now form the characteristic features of modernity. The cult of money replaced the cult of God.

This expansion of actualities, finally, reached American Indians and destroyed them by means of a mighty blow made by the external and really dangerous structure. This blow was a complementary counterpart of the Indian prophecy. Soldiers, buffalo-killers, gold-seekers and homesteaders all were ultimately governed by the new opposition acted out somewhere in a small Protestant community. Myth, however, as it was shown above, justified this tragedy.

In this context it is also notable that the major advances in science were pre-empted by the mythological thinking. The idea that the earth rotates around the sun and not vice versa was predicted by ancient sun-worshippers who put the sun in the center of the universe. Darwin’s stress on the animal origin of man seem to be nothing more than the establishment of monotheism within the totemic paradigm; Einstein’s theory of relativity is merely a confirmation of the archaic conception of time; modern means of the mass media communication were envisaged by the primitive belief in magic (cf. the broadcasting of Kashpirovski’s hypnotic and curing seances on television); while Lévi-Strauss himself has conceded that his theory is a myth about myth.

Comparing the fate of American Indians with the Protestant “hocus-pocus”, one may notice the contrariness of motivational directionality rooted in the paradoxical character of the chronotope.
The actor’s full knowledge of possibilities is contrasted with the problem of catching the contingent forms which the mediated oppositions actually take. Life is a myth but the significant discrepancy lies in the fact that the myth of real life is related in the direction opposite to the verbal narration of myth. Europeans are wrong believing in the weakness of their knowledgeableability. They stubbornly refuse to consider a fact to be fact. The phrases such as “to believe in one’s own forces”, “to believe in oneself”, thus, form the basic imperative of modern European thinking. Alternatively, they are right in assuming that life unfolds in the direction opposite to the verbal narration of myth. The traditional societies, contrariwise, are right affirming their full awareness but fatally unable to “go up to the wires”, “to suck the marrow out of life”. Savages verbally cultivate their expert systems, while Europeans aim at their abnegation.

The abnegation of the expert consciousness is pursued in two ways. First, the globalization processes launched by modernity reduce the variety of environments. Second, the emergence and development of science reduce the variety of interpretations of these environments introducing what Alfred Schütz has called ‘the reciprocity of perspectives’ (Schütz A. 1990 : 11ff). Myth allows, say, the sun to be defined as a hero, as a boy, as an old man, as a bull, as one or as several, or whatever, while science affirms that it can be only a heavenly body. No proofs can satisfactorily explain why it can not be seen as a heavenly body and as a bull in one and the same time but the modern belief in the unitary perspective of the non-social world is extremely strong.

Myth as a self-referential system tells how actualities are temporalized, or brought to naught, while life as a body-referential system tells how, springing up from the naught and coming on to unfold progressively (for instance, material production, capital accumulation, the multiplication of interactive perspectives), they eliminate possibilities. Life does not contradict myth but it negates it by asserting that the myth is also a myth.

Notably, such books as were written by Goffman can not be written about a primitive society. Savages, having been exceptionally versatile in fostering varieties of perspectives of the non-social world, possessed a unitary perspective of other individuals emphasizing their status relations and suppressing the role-performing activities. Role performances were conducted vicariously. It strikingly contrasts with the overall preponderance of kinship which tended to envelope the whole universe of humans. Within the kinship domain no others exist which are dissociated and separated from an Ego, since every kinship position obtains sense only due to and in relation to another kinship position. Nevertheless the ontological propinquity of the people led to their desperate existential remoteness and mutual isolation.

As it was suggested above, at the earliest stage of the development of mankind, public sphere was organized by the chronotope-bound linguistic classification and only by it.
Consequently, the history of mankind is characterised by the gradual retreat of language as a means of rational classification and emergence of other ways of information storage.

Early attempts to structure interpersonal relations in a non-linguistic fashion may be observed in the customs of joking relationships, avunculate, avoidance, patrilate (or the couvade). From kinship terminologies, it can be traced out how the aforementioned interactive habits cropped up and substituted for the elaborate kinship classification (cf.: Dziebel G. V. 1997b). Ancient languages excluded the unconscious from public sphere, whereas modern speech communications are based on the abnegation of the expert consciousness and creation of the unconscious.

As regards the differences in formal aspects of public behavior, two representative accounts, one from the Amazonian Indians and the other from Europeans, may be cited:

“When an Indian talks he sits down, no conversation is ever carried on when the speakers are standing unless it be a serious difference of opinion under discussion; nor, when he speaks, does the Indian look at the person addressed, any more than the latter watches the speaker. Both look at some outside objects. This is the attitude also of the Indian when addressing more than one listener, so that he appears to be talking to some one not visibly present” (Whiffen T. 1915: 254).

“Once a set of participants have avowedly opened themselves up to one another for an engagement, an eye-to-eye ecological huddle tends to be carefully maintained, maximizing the opportunity for participants to monitor one another's mutual perceivings” (Goffman E. 1963a: 95).

Conclusion: Society as the Self-Transcending System

Proceeding from the conception of social chronotope, one may formulate a view of society as the self-transcending system. Self-transcendence is based on the intrinsic co-dependence of self-referentiality and body-referentiality; it is the heterogeneous system which reveals two modes of existence, namely the spatial reproduction and temporal creation. A self-transcending system becomes system only providing that it gets to understand itself as environment. For the self-transcending theory of society, both the ‘anthropological’ tradition which considers society to consist of actors and the ‘sociological’ tradition which is currently strongly disputed by Luhmann and which considers society to be composed of relations (called communications, actions, interactions, interests etc.) are unacceptable. Society as the self-transcending system is made-up of actors and their relations to the time-space framework. These
relations are established by means of actions, structures, events and powers.

Luhmann gives the following explication of the notion of action:

“Neither psychological motivation, nor reasoning or capacity of argumentation, constitutes action, but simply the attribution as such, that is the linking of selection and responsibility for the narrowing of choice” (Luhmann N. 1986: 178, stress added; Luhmann N. 1978: 102)37.

A similar understanding of action can be found in Goffman. For him, action is an undertaking made for its own sake (Goffman E. 1967: 185), or a situation when “outcome is determined and pay off is awarded all in the same breath of experience” (Goffman E. 1967: 156).

From the point of view of social chronotope, action may be defined as the attribution of the self to a certain point in space. Structure is, then, the attribution of the body to a certain point in space; event is the attribution of the self to a certain instant in time; and power is the attribution of the body to a certain instant in time.

Events, one may agree with Luhmann, reproduce themselves by means of structures. In their turn, structures reproduce themselves by means of actions. This understanding of the correlation between structure and action is present in Giddens’ concept of the duality of structure.

“Duality of structure: Structure as the medium and outcome of the conduct it recursively organizes; the structural properties of social systems do not exist outside of action but are chronically implicated in its production and reproduction” (Giddens A. 1993: 374-377)38.

According to Giddens, action and structure are bound up in the endless process of smooth and mediated mutual reproduction. However it is practically equal to the subordination of action to structure. Marx was employing the same logic claiming that the basis determines the superstructure but allows a feedback from it. The idea of the contradiction between the subject and the external constraint, so prominently expressed by Durkheim and the idea of the acuteness of this contradiction set forth by Luhmann, present real advances, while Giddens’ proposition is an escape from the problem. Actions are involved in an independent process of reproduction, that is to say that they reproduce themselves by means of powers. Powers, in their own turn, reproduce themselves by means of events. The problem of action and structure, thus, should be upgraded and restated as the problem of cyclical mutual dependence of event, structure, action and power.

Statuses are accessible to actors via the chronotope but do not represent any real links between actors. Statuses should be transformed from the state of actualities into the state of possibilities, i.e. they should be treated as roles.
Actors appear to each other as the role-performing entities. Only this reality is immanent to the public sphere. Public sphere is the concentrated version of society wherein people are acting out of their body-referential and self-referential systems, threading, thus, their paths through the chronotope. They live in the chronotope and perceive the world as the chronotope. Ethnomethodologists have rightly criticised the constructivist conception of the actor as a “competent unit” reducible to his skills and comprehension (cf.: Garfinkel H. 1994). As a matter of fact, competence is only one side of the coin, namely the actor’s self-referentiality, and one can justifiably speak of an actor only as a “conflictual unit”, the one who is “left to get on with his or her own affairs” (Sharrock W., Button G. 1991: 141) and to find his own ontological security.

Using this Giddensian term, the author, however, injects it with a redirected meaning. In Giddens’ formulation, the ontological security means that the actor considers himself system and not environment. If one assumes that the individual is sustaining his ontological security, then the tendency of humans to infringe deliberately the boundaries of others’ security systems becomes hardly understandable; for the purpose of keeping one’s own security intact, it is superfluous. Supporting the concept of ontological security with the data on the concentration camps prisoners, Giddens does not question the motives of the other party, of those who ceaselessly attacked the selfhood of the prisoners. Goffman once commented that this policy is often followed under the pretext of establishing security - be it the security of the fatherland in the case of the army or the security of the subject himself from his own “vicious” personality (Goffman E. 1991(1961): 49). The compression of the other’s expert consciousness serves to enhance one’s own unpredictability at the expense of suppressing the unpredictability of others, putting hard constraints on the autonomy of their routines and making these routines fraught with controversies.

Giddens’ terminology is useful but his definitions are fallacious. The ontological security is something that must be gained and not sustained, sought for and not taken for granted. Instead of saying that it presumes “an autonomy of bodily control within predictable routines”, one should interpret this appellation as the unpredictability of the subject within autonomous (non-controversial) routines. Unpredictability stands here for the state when the actor’s expert consciousness possesses the status of actuality. Autonomous routines, in their turn, mean that the outside world is made up of possibilities which impinge on the actor not in a direct way but via reference to the chronotope. Communication should be conducted between the actor’s self and his body and not between the actor’s self and the selves of others, while interaction should go between the actor’s body-referential system and the body-referential systems of others and not within one’s body-referential system.
The author dares to claim that no direct relations exist between actors and, thus, there is no totality surpassing the mere sum of actors, no ‘collective consciousness’ and finally no society in the familiar sense of the word. Actors are bound up with each other vicariously, i.e. by attribution of their selves and bodies to the chronotope by means of events, structures, actions and powers. It is due to the chronotope that these attributive elements are united to produce a society. Every individual, every culture, every nation, every country, thus, possesses its own positionality in the chronotope and these positions form a continuity. It means that they employ different selectivity operations in transforming possibilities into actualities.

Europeans are used to speak about their own society as a paragon of changes and novelties and reserve for savages’ world (and broader to pre-industrial and weakly developed countries) the stigmas ‘stagnation’, ‘archaism’ at best or ‘stability’ and ‘tradition’ at worst. However the deeper one penetrates into the backstage of modern chronotope, the more intensive communication he may observe, although this high-velocity processes occur in time and not in space. The problem ultimately boils down to the synchronization of human chronotope. In other words, the transcendental actor should transcend his own transcendentality and attain the immanent fusion of his self and his body. A self-sufficing and Selbst-referential perfection should be converted - without losing any of its original qualities - into a self-transcending fecundity\textsuperscript{39}.
Notes

1. The Erzya-Mordvinians is a rural population of Finno-Ugric stock occupying about 20 villages and hamlets in several districts of Samara province. The Mordvinians have their recognised territory within the Russian Federation, namely the Republic Mordovia, but the population under study, living farther to the east, enjoys no membership in its national republic.

2. From the point of view of historical morphosemantics, German Selbst conveys the idea of self-referentiality in Luhmann’s sense of the word, while English self functions as a direct opposite to body. Both lexems are of the same Indo-European root but the German word includes an additional affix -st. This element is not a part of the root since German knows several forms where this root appears without -st (e.g. selb-ständig, dasselbe, selber). The original grammatical function of this affix should have been the indication of a reference made from one object to another object and, consequently, the extension of meaning of the word. Compare: German Herbst ‘autumn, fall’, from *herb (?) with English herb, French arbre ‘tree’, English arbour, Polish herbata ‘tea’, Lithuanian arbata ‘tea’. Originally Herbst was a descriptive name for a month (compare: old German Herbstmonat ‘September’) which referred to a certain condition of nature (literally, ‘that of the trees or grass’). Outside of the Latin tradition of calling months numerically, the naturalistic terminology is widely used, as, for instance, in Polish (e. g. listopad ‘November’, from lisc, listek ‘leaf’, upasc, opasc ‘to fall’). The same affix can be observed in the suppletive forms like German Erst, English first, both referring to one, English erstwhile. It is easier to translate literally German Selbst, than English self into Russian, since Russian has a substantive samost ‘the self for its own sake’ which is rarely used in opposition to the word for body, while the root sam functions only as a pronoun ‘myself, himself, herself etc.’.

3. It is worth mentioning that Luhmann’s theory is much less popular as a theoretical underpinning for the new Western social movements (for instance, for German Die Grünen), than Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action, since the former leaves little place for the radical and immediate social change (Ferris J. 1993: 9-10).

4. Earlier Goffman spelled out two basic types of interaction, namely the focused and the unfocused (Goffman E. 1963a).

5. The definition of the complete observation can be found in (Babbie E.1992: 289): “The complete observer... observes a social process without becoming a part of it in any way”.
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16. Languages of primitive people provide an incomparably more differentiated and contextually bound framework for information digesting than modern languages (cf. Malinowski B. 1923). Recent advances in investigation of African ‘class’ languages (Pozdnyakov K. I. 1993) has revealed a highly complicated interrelation between abstraction and natural classification. Further retrospective development of the classificatory capacity of language points to the ‘active’ languages of some
American Indian tribes with their dominant opposition of “animated - unanimated”.


18. The imitation syndrome unduly expanded by Gabriel Tarde (Tarde G.1895) to cover the macrosociological processes, seems to be relevant for the microsociological domain.

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20. The myths of the Hopi Indians, which were used as the ideological basis for The Indian Run, state that “in the days of yore” all human races lived together in peace and friendship. Then a schism happened and the races dispersed throughout the globe. The primordial unity may be restored only by means of reconciling the White Brother and the Red Brother. Running was endowed with ritual significance among many Indian tribes. Hence, the organisers of The Indian Run saw it as a means of establishing harmony amongst mankind.

21. As it is expressed in a recently published book devoted to the youth culture in Russia, “Indianists is a group pursuing mystico-religious goals” (Schepanskaya A. 1993. P. 192).

22. In the pre-Revolutionary Russian historiosophy three pillars of Russian society were enumerated: Orthodoxy (pravoslaviye), Tzarism (samoderzhaviye) and folkness (narodnost’). It seems that the forms change but the essence remains intact.

23. This fact stands in the acute controversy with the Marxist idea that “The state emerges there and then, where and when the classes appear”. Also, it should be noted that the critics of Marxism has drawn attention to the existence of classless states in some regions of the Asia-African world in the Middle Ages. On this basis, the politico-genetic paradox was formulated and the “archaic syndrome” hypothesis was put forward with respect to Russia (cf., for example, Popov V. 1990).

24. The author recorded this situation during his field research in Samara Province. Naturally enough, in the President elections of 1995, 90% of the rural population in this province voted for the leader of the Communist Party, G. Zyuganov.

25. An extensive analysis of the spatialized projects of modernity can be found in (Harvey D. 1995 (1990)), although the author can not agree with Harvey’s conclusion that modernity has led to the compression of space.

26. This regularity received an analysis in (Baudrillard J. 1990)

27. As regards graduality in the transformation of the class structure in the West, see the recent discussion in International Sociology [Clark T. N., Lipset S. M. 1991; Hout M., Brooks C., Manza J. 1993; Pakulski J 1993; Clark T. N., Lipset S. M., Rempel P. 1993].

28. The protestant (sic!) English word action is untranslatable into orthodox (sic!) Russian. Casual renditions found in dictionaries (deistviye, postupok) connote quite a different thing, namely a stepwise and continuous process (something like stepping), or the processes occurring due to the activity of an external force (e.g. deistviye of a device). English and Russian notions converge in the fact that both action and deistviye can refer to a theatrical or movie performance but even in this case the English action is momentously set while the Russian deistviye proishodit or razvorachivaetsya.
The discrepancy of the connotations explains why the word *action* has become so popular - probably, via Hippies - in Russian youth subculture.

29. It proves that Luhmann’s theory of self-referentiality is applicable to a society other than Western. This falls into contradiction with his persuasion that every theory correlates with the social system within which it was produced (Beyer P. 1984: VI). Again, as concerns Luhmann’s ideas, the quest for the standpoint is quite burning.

30. A Pueblo Indian myth tells about a gathering of malevolent Indian sorcerers. They were excelling in demonstrating each other their skills in black magic and tortures until finally the last of them joined the competition. He said that he did not intend to startle them with similar tricks but wished to tell just a story. He proceeded to tell them all the story of the European conquest of America and added that each time he had been uttering a word it had been coming true. The black magicians were terrified and titled him the strongest among them (Silko L.M. 1980: 112-114).

31. A celebrated American anthropologist Franz Boas liked to describe the impression of one of his Kwakiutl informants about the city. As Roman Jakobson recalls: “Boas loved to depict the indifference of this man from Vancouver Island toward Manhattan skyscrapers (“we built houses next to each other, and you stack them on top of each other”), toward the Aquarium (“we throw such fish back in the lake”) or toward the motion pictures which seemed tedious and senseless. On the other hand, the stranger stood for hours spellbound in the Times Square freak shows with their giants and dwarfs, bearded ladies and fox-tailed girls, or in the Automates where drinks and sandwiches appear miraculously and where he felt transferred into the universe of Kwakiutl fairy-tales” (Jakobson R. 1959: 142).

32. An Indian shaman, once being told about the fact that the earth is round, remarked: “We always knew that the circle is sacred, that is why we arranged our tents in the circle and worshipped the sun”. His logic may be continued in the following way. The fact that the earth is round does not contradict the Indian belief in that it is flat. The earth is round not in the same way as the ball, since one can go over the earth in an upright posture without falling down, while one will surely fail to do the same with the ball. Finally, man is not a cockroach who can easily go round the ball.

33. Art, to be sure, allows a wide range of interpretations of phenomena but they are taken merely as a means of achieving poetic expressiveness. As a famous Russian poet Andrei Bely put it, “By calling the sun ‘a red-horned bull’ a poet does not believe this to be true, while the primitive mind surely does” (Bely A. 1914).

34. One may ponder why both Goffman and Garfinkel were studying the interaction order and both believed that the world is a scene, but the results of dramaturgy are so meticulously fascinating and the results of ethnomethodology are so meticulously boring. It could be due to the fact that Goffman was more interested in the interaction proper, while Garfinkel focused on the communication. The latter, however, is not well developed in European society with its deep body-referentiality. As Garfinkel said about ethnomethodology, “the “skin” of the person will be left intact. Instead questions will be confined to the that can be performed upon events that are scenic to the person” (Garfinkel H. 1963: 190). In the light of this suggestion, ethnomethodologists’ persuasion that they are doing alternative sociology becomes quite comprehensible. Were Garfinkel examining “primitive” communication, his outcomes, perhaps, would have been much more gripping.
35. Earlier attempts to give sociological grounds for the paradoxes of primitive culture (cf., e.g. (Radcliffe-Brown A. R. 1952)) ignored the chronotopic difference between interaction and communication. The author believes that such phenomena as totemism, shamanism, witchcraft, reincarnation beliefs and so on stem from the vicarious role-performing activities.

36. An Indian from the Blackfoot tribe in North America once told the author about this general Indian habit not to look at the speaker in the every-day conversations and assured that it did not mean any inattention.

37. Evidently this suggestion is a radicalised version of Parsons' concept of action (Parsons T. 1968 (1937): 43ff), the one which strips the action of its structure.

38. Critics tend to consider this innovation a valuable contribution to the extant views on the association of agency and collective forms of social life (cf.: Cohen I. J. 1996: 130-135).

39. The idea of this conversion is attributed by scholars to the intellectual heritage of Plato (cf.: Lovejoy A. 1936: 49) and can also be discerned in Christian belief in God on the earth.

References


Jürna I. Women in Russia: Building a Movement // Basic Needs to Basic Rights.


Schepanskaya A. 1993. Simvolika molodezhnoi subkultury (The Symbolism of the...
Youth Subculture). St. Petersburg.


1 The Erzya-Mordvinians is a rural population of Finno-Ugric stock occupying about 20 villages and hamlets in several districts of Samara province. The Mordvinians have their recognized territory within the Russian Federation, namely the Republic Mordovia, but the population under study, living farther to the east, enjoys no membership in its national republic.

2 From the point of view of historical morphosemantics, German Selbst conveys the idea of self-referentiality in Luhmann’s sense of the word, while English self functions as a direct opposite to body. Both lexems are of the same Indo-European root but the German word includes an additional affix -st. This element is not a part of the root since German knows several forms where this root appears without -st (e.g. selb-ständig, dasselbe, selber). The original grammatical function of this affix should have been the indication of a reference made from one object to another object and, consequently, the extension of meaning of the word. Compare: German Herbst ‘autumn, fall’, from *herb (?) with English herb, French arbre ‘tree’, English arbour, Polish herbata ‘tea’, Lithuanian arbata ‘tea’. Originally Herbst was a descriptive name for a month (compare: old German Herbstmonat ‘September’) which referred to a certain condition of nature (literally, ‘that of the trees or grass’). Outside of the Latin tradition of calling months numerically, the naturalistic terminology is widely used, as, for instance, in Polish (e.g. listopad ‘November’, from liść, listek ‘leaf’,upaść, opaść ‘to fall’). The same affix can be observed in the suppletive forms like German Erst, English first, both referring to one, English erste, erster. It is easier to translate literally German Selbst, than English self into Russian, since Russian has a substantive samoost ‘the self for its own sake’ which is rarely used in opposition to the word for body, while the root sam functions only as a pronoun ‘myself, himself, herself etc.’.

3 It is worth mentioning that Luhmann’s theory is much less popular as a theoretical underpinning for the new Western social movements (for instance, for German Die Grünen), than Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action, since the former leaves little place for the radical and immediate social change (Ferris J. 1993: 9-10).

4 Earlier Goffman was spelling out two basic types of interaction, namely the focused and the unfocused (Goffman E. 1963a).

5 The definition of the complete observation can be found in (Babbie E. 1992: 289): “The complete observer… observes a social process without becoming a part of it in any way”.

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The term xenocentrism in the given meaning appears in (Kent D. P., Burnight R. G. 1951: 256-259).

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